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# REIMER THROUGH CONFUCIAN LENSES

RESONANCES WITH CLASSICAL  
CHINESE AESTHETICS

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*In this paper, I compare all three editions of Bennett Reimer's A Philosophy of Music Education with early Chinese philosophy, in particular, classical Chinese aesthetics. I structure my analysis around a quartet of interrelated themes: aesthetic education, education of feeling, aesthetic experience, and ethics and aesthetics. This paper suggests that Reimer's philosophical writings have some degree of transcultural applicability beyond Western thought, counterpointing criticisms that his philosophy is narrow, ethnocentric, and culturally limited. It also serves as a plausible point of departure towards a transcultural theory of aesthetics for music education relevant to the pluralistic and globalized world in which we live.*

Key Words: Bennett Reimer, aesthetics, Chinese philosophy, comparative philosophy, cross-cultural

Music education has traditionally been undergirded by the utilitarian philos-

ophy of music education: the notion that music contributes to the ethical, intellectual, and social development of students. This philosophy has deep historical roots, spanning from Plato's use of music to develop the ideal citizen to Lowell Mason's claim that music has moral, health, and intellectual benefits.<sup>1</sup> In the early part of the twentieth century, the *Progressive Music Series*, underpinned by the philosophy of John Dewey, purports to develop character through music.<sup>2</sup> Not long after, a movement away from the utilitarian philosophy began. James Mursell argues that music *itself*, rather than the extramusical benefits of music, ought to lie at the core of music education. His writings established the foundation of an aesthetic philosophy of music education which posits that the "esthetic aspects" of music should be emphasized in music education.<sup>3</sup> Subsequently, several other music educators wrote at length on the notion of aesthetic education.<sup>4</sup> In particular, Bennett Reimer drew on the writings of Leonard Meyer, Susanne Langer, and John Dewey among others and published *A Philosophy of Music Education* in 1970.<sup>5</sup> With the publication of this influential book, "Music Education as Aesthetic Education"—an approach that focuses on the aesthetic nature and the aesthetic value of music—became the prevailing music education philosophy in the United States.

Notwithstanding the considerable influence of Reimer's philosophical writings, they have been subjected to a rather harsh battery of criticisms. Amongst them, scholars have argued that the aesthetic paradigm as construed by Reimer has limited transcultural applicability beyond the aesthetic experience of Western art works. Even as the music education fraternity jumped decidedly onto the aesthetic bandwagon, Abraham Schwadron and Douglas Lemmon already began to question if any philosophical monism based on Western aesthetic theories can or should be imposed on all of music education in the United States—a pluralistic society with diverse musical practices.<sup>6</sup> Subsequently, the praxial philosophers who argue that music education ought to center on *doing*, rather than the aesthetic nature and value of music, called for a complete abandonment of the aesthetic philosophy of music education on grounds that it is narrow, ethnocentric, and culturally limited.<sup>7</sup>

In counterpoint to the above criticisms, I suggest in this paper that Reimer's philosophical writings have some degree of transcultural applicability beyond Western thought. Since much has already been written on how culturally limited Reimer's writings are, this present work aims to redress the imbalance that has tilted against Reimer's favor. To this end, I compare all three editions of Reimer's *A Philosophy of Music Education* with early Chinese philosophy—in particular, classical Chinese aesthetics—and note resonances between them.<sup>8</sup> These similarities suggest that when reading Reimer, music educators of Confucian heritage are likely to find themes that they can relate to and apply in their teaching. Since

Reimer and Chinese philosophy both cover a wide terrain, I delimit this paper to four interrelated themes: aesthetic education, education of feeling, aesthetic experience, and ethics and aesthetics.

## AESTHETIC EDUCATION

In recounting his trip to China, Reimer claims that the term “aesthetic education” is hard to translate into Chinese.<sup>9</sup> This seems rather surprising given that “aesthetic education” can rather easily be translated into *shenmei jiaoyu* (审美教育) as has been done in the Chinese translation of Reimer’s book (third edition).<sup>10</sup> While *shenmei* (审美) refers to aesthetics, *jiaoyu* (教育) refers to education. As what ensues tries to make clear, aesthetic education, as well as beauty and taste that Reimer writes about, have parallels in Confucian philosophy.<sup>11</sup>

For Reimer, an aesthetic education “lies at the core of a humane society.”<sup>12</sup> In particular, learning about music is, for Reimer, “a basic way of ‘knowing’ about reality;” hence, music education ought to be valued.<sup>13</sup> Like Reimer, Confucius is of the view that an aesthetic education that places music at its core ought to be the foundation of a “humane” (*ren* 仁) society. As “興於詩，立於禮，成於樂”<sup>14</sup> succinctly captures the notion, one’s education begins by being stimulated by poetry (*shi* 詩), observing rituals (*li* 禮) that are the social and artistic forms of Zhou dynasty theorized by Confucius to encapsulate the peak of human refinement, and ends with music (*yue* 樂). Such a model of education is, as Richard Shusterman argues, distinctly aesthetic.<sup>15</sup> The prominent Chinese aesthetician, Li Zehou, goes so far as to say that for Confucius, the “highest realm of human life was the aesthetic,” further noting that Confucian philosophy itself is “not presented in abstract conceptual arguments, but in the language of poetry and aesthetic appreciation.”<sup>16</sup> Reimer’s emphasis on aesthetic education has long been predated by the Confucians.

In addition, Reimer’s insistence that music education “must proceed from a clear understanding of the aesthetic nature and aesthetic value of music” and focus on the teaching of “good art works” has its Chinese parallel. As Karl-Heinz Pohl notes, the Chinese tradition has a “long evolution of aesthetic thought and reflection,” one that inquires into “the nature of artistic creativity and the artistic qualities of a work of art.”<sup>17</sup> The notion of art works does not seem to be an exclusively Western-centric conception.<sup>18</sup> Among many other aestheticians, Li Zehou frequently refers to “art works” (*yishu zuopin* 艺术作品) in his writings.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, art works such as paintings, calligraphy, pottery, and sculpture are an integral aspect of Chinese civilization.<sup>20</sup> Although they are not created expressly for purposes of Kantian aesthetic contemplation (the Chinese philosophical tradition makes no dualistic separation between the aesthetic and utilitarian uses of art), they are nonetheless human creations that delight the senses and are reflected

and commented on. Reimer's emphasis on the aesthetic study of good art works is not anachronistic to Chinese philosophy.

As noted earlier, the term "aesthetics" is often translated as *shenmei* (审美). *Mei* (美) refers to "beauty," an important term that appears at least twelve times in the *Analects* and eighty one times in the *Xunzi*.<sup>21</sup> As Kwang-ming Wu notes, "beauty pervades life for the Chinese and reaches towards the noble and true."<sup>22</sup> This parallels Reimer's argument that "the beauty or truth we find in art has some relation to the beauty or truth of life as lived and known."<sup>23</sup> In short, both the Reimerian and Chinese notions of aesthetics relate to the beautiful and the true.

Furthermore, the beautiful is also related to taste. Etymologically, 美 (*mei*: beauty) comprises two parts: the character for "ram" (*yang* 羊) above the character for "large" (*da* 大), suggesting that "when a ram is large, it is beautiful."<sup>24</sup> A fatter ram offers more meat and fulfills, first of all, the utilitarian function of food to satisfy hunger. It is only when one's hunger has been satisfied that one begins to taste; after all, flavor is meaningless to one who is famished. A fatter ram satisfies hunger, enables one to taste, and in so doing, enables sensory pleasure—the basis of the aesthetic appreciation of the beautiful. Beauty in the Chinese tradition, therefore, is inextricably linked to taste (*wei* 味). Like German *Geschmack*, 美 connotes aesthetic appreciation and taste at the same time.<sup>25</sup> As the *Zhongyong* puts it, "There is no one who does not eat and drink, but it is rare to find someone who can distinguish the flavors."<sup>26</sup> Taste is an important value in Chinese aesthetics.

The emphasis on taste in Chinese aesthetics is echoed by Reimer, who writes, "the entire music education enterprise is built on the assumption that musical tastes can be improved." He further adds that this should result in "a movement toward 'better' musical experiences of 'better' music."<sup>27</sup> For Reimer, cultivating "taste" for "good" music<sup>28</sup> is an important goal of music education. Confucius is an example of a student Reimer would love to nurture: his musical taste is so discerning and sensitive that he is able to recognize the beauty (*mei* 美) and goodness (*shan* 善) of *Shao* (韶) music immediately.<sup>29</sup> In fact, the experience of the beauty and goodness of *Shao* music is so intense for Confucius that he forgets the taste (*wei* 味) of meat for three months,<sup>30</sup> thus establishing close connections between beauty, goodness, and taste that Reimer also advocates.

It is clear, therefore, that to both Reimer and the early Chinese, aesthetic education is an important aspect of human civilization. Beauty and taste are also important themes in their aesthetic philosophies. Having unpacked some introductory ideas, I proceed now to probe into the justifications of aesthetic education.

## EDUCATION OF FEELING

For Reimer, aesthetic education is the education of feeling.<sup>31</sup> As what follows makes clear, both Reimer and the early Chinese recognize the limitations of language and turn to music as a means of education of feeling. Such an education of feeling is by no means trivial, as feeling, for both Reimer and the Chinese, is of no lesser value than thinking. Furthermore, the feeling that is shared through art enables humans to unite as a single humanity.

In arguing for the limitations of language, Reimer draws on Langer's distinction between discursive and non-discursive forms.<sup>32</sup> According to Langer, discursive forms such as language gather meaning in a linear, logical fashion and offer insights into the rational and intellectual aspects of life. By contrast, non-discursive or presentational forms such as the arts are characterized by their immediate, holistic, "all-at-once" quality; they allow humans to experience the non-logical, qualitative, and affective aspects of life. Since the arts can do what language cannot, Langer argues that the arts are not cultural frills: to neglect its education is to neglect the education of feeling. Music, in particular, is central to the education of feeling.<sup>33</sup>

The limitation of language and the need for music education as education of feeling are similarly noted by the ancient Chinese.<sup>34</sup> The *I-Ching* (易經) or *Book of Changes* makes it clear that since "writing cannot completely express language, nor can language completely express meaning," the sages "established the images to fully express meaning."<sup>35</sup> Where language fails, art takes over. Like Langer and Reimer, the ancient Chinese are of the view that language cannot express the non-conceptual, non-logical, and feelingful aspects of life.<sup>36</sup> Music is crucial to fill that gap. As the *Shijing* (詩經) or the *Book of Songs* elegantly describes, "Where words are inadequate, one sighs; where sighs are inadequate, one sings . . . [F]eelings are expressed in sound and sound, when patterned, is called music."<sup>37</sup> Like the Reimerian conception of education, music in the Confucian tradition serves as an education of feeling (*qing* 情).<sup>38</sup>

For Reimer, an aesthetic education, one that centers on feeling, ought not to be construed as being inferior to subjects that primarily develop reasoning skills. In the third edition of his text, Reimer argues that contra traditional Western bias, feeling is not radically separated from thinking, nor should it be of lesser value than thinking. He also draws on Antonio Damasio's critique of Descartes' Cartesianism and argues that the mind and the body are interdependent. In short, for Reimer, "body, mind, and feeling are integrally related."<sup>39</sup>

Reimer's battle against Western philosophical dualisms that hark back to Plato finds support in the Chinese philosophical tradition that never made rigid distinctions between the body and the mind, and feeling and thinking. For the ancient Chinese, feeling is inextricably linked to thinking. This is explicitly demon-

strated in the character 心 (*xin*), commonly translated as “heart” and “mind”: one cannot be separated from the other, nor can the cognitive be disentangled from the affective.<sup>40</sup> Furthermore, *xin* (heart-mind) is intimately connected to doing in that it predisposes humans to act rather than construct a framework of abstract ideas. In fact, feeling itself, in Chinese epistemology, is an important form of knowledge and the virtues prized in the Chinese philosophical tradition are what Qingping Liu coins “emotionales” (*qingli* 情理) rather than “rationales” (Greek *eidos*).<sup>41</sup> Given the importance accorded to feeling in the Chinese tradition, it is no wonder that Confucian education is primarily aesthetic. Reimer’s argument that subjects that educate feeling ought to be placed *pari passu* with subjects that develop reasoning skills finds its strong ally in the holistic construal of the heart-mind in the Chinese philosophical tradition. It is one thing to try to tear down entrenched dualisms, quite another to draw on an alternative tradition where such dualisms never existed.

Furthermore, feeling is important for both Reimer and the Confucians as the feeling that is shared through art enables humans to unite as a single humanity. As Kong Yingda notes in his commentary on the *Shijing* (詩經: *Book of Songs*), “What one expresses in a poem is but one’s own personal heart, yet this ‘personal’ heart is actually the heart of the whole people . . . [T]he poet unites the hearts of all under heaven, and the ways of the four corners of the earth.”<sup>42</sup> This resonates with Reimer who notes that the “insight about feeling” that art offers enables humans to probe “below the surface differences and divisions of daily life to a point where the common humanity of people can be glimpsed and felt.”<sup>43</sup> Indeed, Confucius is likely to agree with Reimer’s argument that “it is precisely in this sharing of insight into the common nature of humanity that art exercises its humanistic effects.”<sup>44</sup> For both Reimer and the Confucians, although feeling begins with the individual, aesthetic education is not so much a form of education that indulges in feeling for its own sake, as it is a form of humanistic education.

I hope to have made clear, therefore, that both Reimer and the Chinese argue that language is limited and turn to music for the education of feeling. They regard feeling as having equal significance to thinking and posit that the feeling that is shared through art enables humans to experience their common humanity. Having unpacked the education of feeling, I turn now to discuss the nature of the aesthetic experience.

## AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

In his writings, Reimer seems to draw on both the Kantian and Deweyan conceptions of the aesthetic experience. Criticisms of Reimer’s writings seem to be directed towards its Kantian rather than its Deweyan aspects, in particular, towards the Kantian notion that the aesthetic experience is disinterested, distanced,

apart from life, and culturally and historically limited.<sup>45</sup> There is furthermore the concern that the Deweyan and Kantian conceptions of the aesthetic experience are diametrically opposed and fundamentally incompatible with each other.<sup>46</sup>

Drawing on Confucian literature and *yin-yang* (陰陽) dialectical theory, I posit that the opposing elements in Reimer's construal of the aesthetic experience are not contradictions; on the contrary, they complement each other to present a nuanced picture of the nature of the aesthetic experience.<sup>47</sup> Contra dualistic thinking that casts opposites in mutually exclusive terms, *yin-yang* theory is a correlative approach of conceptual polarity whereby opposites are poles on a continuum that complement each other: "left" requires "right," "day" requires "night," "up" requires "down," and *yin* (陰) requires *yang* (陽).<sup>48</sup> Any one aspect or quality in *yin-yang* theory can be understood by alluding to its opposite. Below, I present three interrelated pairs of dialectical themes drawn from Reimer's writings that may be understood in *yin-yang* terms.<sup>49</sup>

*Intrinsic and instrumental.* For Reimer, an aesthetic experience is "intrinsic," by which Reimer means that it "serves no utilitarian purpose" and is "experience for the sake of experience in and of itself." It is "disinterested"—not lacking in interest, but lacking in concern about pragmatic outcomes.<sup>50</sup> Although Reimer cites Max Schoen rather than Kant, these ideas are unmistakably Kantian.<sup>51</sup> In the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant argues that "pleasure in the beautiful" (*Wohlgefallen am Schönen*) must necessarily be "disinterested" or "without interest" (*ohne Interesse*) in its instrumental use.<sup>52</sup> This enables beauty and morality to be disentangled and justified independently, thereby forming the basis of "art for art's sake" which frees art from the dominant utilitarian philosophy of the time.<sup>53</sup> Since Reimer positions his philosophy in his early years as a reaction to the utilitarian philosophy of music education, the Kantian notion of a "disinterested" aesthetic experience is a natural and appropriate philosophical resource to buttress his position.<sup>54</sup> Simultaneously, however, Reimer argues that the experience of art enables humans to realize important values such as Dewey's "self-unification," as if he were reviving the ancient instrumental value of art to cultivate humans.<sup>55</sup> Such a conflation of the intrinsic and the instrumental would, in dualistic thinking, appear to be a contradiction in terms.<sup>56</sup>

*Yin-yang* dialectical thinking offers a plausible solution. On the one hand, much has been written on how the aesthetic experience serves instrumental purposes of self-cultivation in classical Confucianism.<sup>57</sup> Like the Deweyan conception of "self-unification" through music cited by Reimer, Confucius advocates the "completion" (*cheng* 成) of oneself through music.<sup>58</sup> On the other hand, the manner in which Confucius exclaims, "overflowing—how they fill the ear!"<sup>59</sup> upon hearing the music of Master Zhi suggests a delight in the sound of music



for its own sake.<sup>60</sup> In another passage, Confucius distinguishes between music that is beautiful and morally good (*Shao* music) and music that is beautiful but not morally good (*Wu* music).<sup>61</sup> Read through Kantian lenses, *Wu* music would be “Satisfaction in the Beautiful” but not “Satisfaction in the Good.”<sup>62</sup> Although Confucius expresses his preference for music that is both beautiful and morally good,<sup>63</sup> there is nonetheless a similarity to Kant in that beauty can stand on its own: there *is* music that can be beautiful but not morally good. It would be a stretch of course, to claim that this predates “art for art’s sake;” still, there is the suggestion that the beauty of the music may be delighted in for its own sake.

In short, in the Chinese tradition, an aesthetic experience is intrinsic and instrumental; there is no either-or dualistic separation. As Reimer would say, an aesthetic experience is appreciated for its own sake; it can simultaneously do something to better humans. In *yin-yang* manner, the intrinsic and the instrumental complement each other.

*Distanced and immediate.* For Reimer, music teachers and students can become so preoccupied with technique that they are unable to maintain a certain “psychical distance” to experience music aesthetically—a Kantian construal of the aesthetic experience that is related to the “quiet contemplation” of art that Reimer also notes.<sup>64</sup> Simultaneously, Reimer posits that while the nature of the aesthetic experience is “distanced,” it is also “involved, outgoing, responsive”—a construal of the aesthetic experience that appears Deweyan rather than Kantian in its immediacy.<sup>65</sup> In addition, Reimer mines the distinctively Deweyan conception of “doing” and “undergoing” and parallels them to “aesthetic perception” and “aesthetic reaction” respectively in his construal of the aesthetic experience.<sup>66</sup> Viewed via the lenses of dualistic thinking, Reimer’s conflation of Kantian distance and Deweyan immediacy appears illogical. Even the neo-pragmatist philosopher Richard Shusterman, who is usually at pains to reconcile traditional Western dualisms, seems to see the two theories as being rather mutually exclusive.<sup>67</sup> After all, how can an aesthetic experience be distanced *and* immediate?

Perhaps Confucius may have an answer. In an oft-cited passage on Confucian aesthetic experience, Confucius hears *Shao* (beautiful and good) music while he is in the state of *Qi* and exclaims, “I never imagined that the making of music could reach this level!” Furthermore, he is so struck by the music that for three months, he does not know the taste of meat.<sup>68</sup> In the manner of Deweyan doing and undergoing, Confucius hears *Shao* music (aesthetic perception: “doing”), reacts to it (aesthetic reaction: “undergoing”), and has an aesthetic experience: a perfect exemplification of Reimer’s “aesthetic perception x aesthetic reaction = aesthetic experience.”<sup>69</sup> Just as Reimer insists that students ought to be educated in aesthetic perception so that aesthetic reaction happens naturally,<sup>70</sup> Confucius

has clearly been so well trained that he is sensitive to and immediately reacts to the aesthetic qualities of *Shao* music. The result is an aesthetic experience that is immediate, intense,<sup>71</sup> and sensuous<sup>72</sup>—one that is akin to the Deweyan conception of the aesthetic experience.

As noted earlier, upon hearing *Shao* music, Confucius could not discern the taste of meat for three months (*Analects* 7.14). Whether one chooses to read “three months” literally or metaphorically to refer to “a long time,”<sup>73</sup> the fact remains that Confucius remains engaged with the music well after the actual sounds have ceased. Since he longer hears the sounds literally, it is reasonable to surmise that he is not reacting to the music based on perception, but upon contemplation. Indeed, the notion of “quiet contemplation”<sup>74</sup> that Reimer writes about recalls the *Daxue* (大學): “One needs to be quiet (*jing* 靜) before one feels secure; one needs to be secure before one can contemplate (*li* 慮); and one needs to contemplate before one can comprehend.”<sup>75</sup> Since the Confucian curriculum includes music, one may surmise that “quiet contemplation” includes music. While we cannot know for sure if Confucius is indeed contemplating in the strict Kantian sense of the term, there is nonetheless a certain similarity in the sense of distance: there is no actual music present, and the involvement is mental rather than sensuous.

I have shown, therefore, that Reimer’s synthesis of the distanced and immediate finds support in ancient Chinese philosophy. In the manner of *yin* and *yang*, a contemplative approach complements that of an active, direct one. Both conceptions of the aesthetic experience present a more complete picture than if Reimer had subscribed to one construal of the aesthetic experience.

*Apart and a part.* The combination of Kantian and Deweyan ideas presents one final problem: while Kant’s aesthetic theory is one that is concerned with the experience of fine art, such as the contemplation of Western art works in the concert hall, Dewey famously criticizes the “museum” conception of art and argues that one may have an aesthetic experience via even ordinary living.<sup>76</sup> The Kantian construal sees art as being *apart* from life; the Deweyan construal wants art to be *a part* of life. Both aspects are seen in Reimer’s writings. On the one hand, he writes about art that is for “contemplation of the museum or concert hall;” on the other hand, he argues “art is intimately connected to life rather than totally distinct from it.”<sup>77</sup> An aesthetic experience that is apart from life appears, *prima facie*, inconsistent with one that is a part of life.

Dewey’s writings offer a plausible solution. The point, for Dewey, is not to deny the existence of museums or concert halls, but to recover the continuity between art and ordinary living separated as a result of Continental philosophy’s preoccupation with fine art. For Dewey, art is continuous with life yet maintains

a distinct position as art *qua* art.<sup>78</sup> Consistent with pragmatist anti-dualism and the “continuity thesis”<sup>79</sup> which resonates with *yin-yang* theory, Dewey does not construe aesthetic experiences that are apart from and a part of life to be mutually exclusive. On the contrary, being aware of aesthetic experiences in ordinary living—which for Dewey includes the fire-engine rushing by and machines excavating holes<sup>80</sup>—enables a heightened response towards art *as* art, and vice versa. In its relation to life, the Deweyan conception of the aesthetic experience parallels that of the Chinese: one may have an aesthetic experience whether one is butchering an ox or listening to *Shao* classical music.<sup>81</sup> Tu Wei-ming aptly notes that the “dichotomy of art for art and art for life is a rather impoverished view of the Dao in its all-embracing fullness.”<sup>82</sup> Dewey and Reimer would agree.

As Shusterman puts it, “the aim, to adapt Dewey’s museum metaphor, is not to close or destroy art museums but to open and enlarge them.”<sup>83</sup> One need not be embarrassed nor make apologies about wanting an aesthetic experience in a “musical museum”—the concert hall. Many musical works of art, including modern Chinese orchestral pieces, are composed with the intent of being listened to in a concert hall, a sanctuary that offers repose from daily living. At the same time, the aesthetic experience can and should be an important part of daily life. Our “musical museums” ought to be, as Dewey advises, “opened and enlarged” by being aware that ordinary living is full of art—if only one would notice. In *yin-yang* terms, the aesthetic experiences from daily living complement those in the museums; there is no dualistic separation between the two.

Taking stock, the nature of the aesthetic experience as portrayed by Reimer is intrinsic *and* instrumental, distanced *and* immediate, and apart from life *and* a part of life. The juxtaposition of what seem to be diametrically opposed elements is not a weakness, but a strength. Like Confucius who borrows from what he considers the best cultural aspects of the Xia, the Zhou, and the Yin, and weaves them into a whole,<sup>84</sup> Reimer freely draws from Kant and Dewey and puts forward a nuanced theory of aesthetic experience for the betterment of music education. Just as writers who draw on Plato’s *Republic* are by no means obligated to share their wives with their friends, Reimer does not have to remain bounded to all aspects of Kantian and Deweyan theories just because they are his sources of inspiration. To make a case against the aesthetic philosophy of music education on grounds that the Kantian aspects appear culturally and historically limited neglects the Deweyan elements, makes a straw man of Reimer’s ideas, and impoverishes music education. For such is the richness of the aesthetic experience and Reimer, Confucius, Kant, and Dewey would all nod in agreement.

## ETHICS AND AESTHETICS

Earlier I noted that since Reimer positions his aesthetic philosophy primarily as a reaction to utilitarian philosophy, Kantian “disinterested” aesthetic experience is an apt source of philosophical support. Interestingly, just as Kant separates ethics and the aesthetics at first but later draws connections between the two in his notion of “beauty as a symbol of morality,”<sup>85</sup> Reimer revives the ancient connection between ethics and aesthetics after he disentangles them. In coupling ethics and aesthetics, his writings, in particular those in the second and third editions, resonate with those of many other philosophers, including Confucius.

In a section entitled “Art, Morality, and Discipline” in the second edition of Reimer’s philosophy, Reimer draws on Dewey and argues that morality in art is the “genuineness of the artist’s interaction with his materials.”<sup>86</sup> Reimer then relates morality and genuineness in art to discipline. For Reimer, discipline is not the idea of “forcing oneself to do tedious work, such as practicing,” nor is it “morality in the superficial sense of acting in accordance with society’s rules and regulations.” Rather, it is an “inner self-control, freely exercised to serve larger ends.” Citing the example of Beethoven, whom he regards as a genuine musician who was disciplined in his approach to his art, Reimer argues that Beethoven does what is needed because it is “inherently right to do.” Thus, when students engage with his music, they do not merely “learn about” morality, genuineness, and discipline; they go a step further to “experience” them.

Reimer’s ideas bear several resemblances to Chinese philosophy. To begin with, Reimer’s notion of “genuineness” resonates with a key Chinese philosophical term—*cheng* (誠: perfect genuineness; authenticity; sincerity; integrity)—which as I have argued elsewhere is a central aspect of Confucian creativity.<sup>87</sup> Similarly, Reimer’s reservation about “morality in the superficial sense of acting in accordance with society’s rules” recalls the Confucian warning against rigid moral rules.<sup>88</sup> Most importantly, what Reimer calls “discipline,” by which he means an “inner self-control, freely exercised to serve larger ends” and doing what is “inherently right to do,” bear striking resemblances to the Confucian notion of *yi* (義): an ethical virtue of rightness or appropriateness that transcends rules. For Confucius, “Exemplary persons (*junzi* 君子) in making their way in the world are neither bent on nor against anything; rather, they go with what is *yi* (義).”<sup>89</sup> Projecting Confucian lenses onto Reimer, as students engage with the music of Beethoven, they do not merely learn about *yi*; they experience *yi*. The sense of aesthetic rightness in the music of Beethoven enables students to come into direct contact with the sense of ethical rightness (*yi*) more efficaciously than a sermon on moral education. Just as Confucius advocates the orchestral ballet music of Emperor Shun in order for one to experience morality,<sup>90</sup> Reimer forwards the

music of Beethoven. In Reimer's words, "music educators do not provide discipline or teach morality. Music does."<sup>91</sup>

In the third edition of Reimer's philosophy, he explores several other ethical themes in music education, including trust, competence, cooperation, and mutual respect, with reference to what he calls "creative musical roles."<sup>92</sup> For him, regardless of our roles as musicians (that is, composer, conductor, ensemble performer, or audience), we are always mutually dependent on one another. Therefore, trust is the "bedrock on which the musical enterprise rests, making a moral/ethical demand on all involved with it."<sup>93</sup> Reimer then discusses competence, noting that in every creative musical role, individuals are ethically obligated to accomplish what is required of them. He equally values cooperation and sees it as an ethical value as it necessitates self-restraint (such as performing together in ensembles, or a soloist working with a composer's ideas) in service of a greater good. Finally, mutual respect serves, for Reimer, as the common ground from which all ethical values (that is, trust, competence, and cooperation) spring. So crucial is mutual respect that he calls it "the engine" that powers "the interactions of ethical responsibilities" in the various roles we undertake in music education.<sup>94</sup>

One cannot help but notice the remarkable similarities between Reimer's ethical construal of "creative musical roles" and what Roger Ames terms "Confucian role ethics,"<sup>95</sup> whereby morality is construed in relational rather than individualistic terms. To begin with, the manner in which Reimer presents music education in terms of an array of musical roles parallels the role-based nature of Confucian creativity.<sup>96</sup> The mutual dependence of musicians in different musical roles that Reimer writes about finds its affinity with the concept of the Confucian social self whereby humans in fulfilling their unique social roles shape the social environment and are reciprocally shaped in the process.<sup>97</sup> In addition, just as Reimer sees trust as the "bedrock" of creative musical roles, Confucius considers trust (*xin* 信) the foundation of role ethics.<sup>98</sup> Trust in role ethics is also related to *ren* (仁): benevolence, goodness, good, or human-heartedness. While the left side of the character (亻) refers to a "person," the right side (二) stands for the number "two." To be *ren*, therefore, there needs to be at least two persons: morality begins with two rather than one person; persons who are *ren* are relational in their thoughts and actions,<sup>99</sup> thus entailing the kinds of cooperation between the various creative musical roles that Reimer unpacks. Finally, competence and mutual respect as Reimer construes them find resonance in the Confucian "single thread" (*yiguan* 一貫). For Confucius, the "single thread" is two-fold. First, *zhong* (忠) or "devotion to the duties of one's role," recalls Reimer's "competence" or an ethical obligation to accomplish that which is expected. Second, *shu* (恕) or "reciprocity," resembles Reimer's "mutual respect" in its emphasis on not doing unto others what people do not wish to be done unto them.<sup>100</sup>

I hope to have made clear, therefore, that the ethical values that Reimer unpacks are theoretically consistent with Confucian writings. Just as students experience *yi* (義: rightness, appropriateness) through Beethoven and Emperor Shun's music, they experience the ethical values of trust, competence, cooperation, and mutual respect through active participation in their various creative musical roles. In seeing music education as "putting ethics to work" in a "distinctive way characteristic of music,"<sup>101</sup> Reimer's philosophy parallels Confucian "meliorative aestheticism"—the betterment of oneself, society, and civilization via a cultural and artistic framework.<sup>102</sup> At the beginning of this paper, I noted that music education has traditionally been justified on the utilitarian philosophy, including the moral development of students. We seem to have come full circle: Reimer's aesthetic philosophy is inescapably ethical. As Wittgenstein would say, ethics and aesthetics are one.<sup>103</sup>

## CONCLUSION

In sum, I have viewed Reimer through Confucian lenses and noted resonances between his writings and classical Chinese aesthetics. The common themes I have explored are aesthetic education, education of feeling, the nature of the aesthetic experience, and ethics and aesthetics. By noting the similarities, I hope to have been successful in suggesting that Reimer's philosophical writings have some degree of transcultural applicability beyond West thought, thereby providing an alternative perspective to claims that Reimer's writings are narrow, ethnocentric, and culturally limited. Another value of finding parallels between Reimer and Confucius is that Confucian thought expands Reimer, and helps reconcile some of the apparent contradictions in his ideas.

Needless to say, this work of comparative philosophy cannot lay claim to greater transcultural generalization as it compares Reimer with only one philosophical tradition, albeit a major one with far-reaching influences. Future research may build on the conceptual grounds established in this paper and examine how Reimer's ideas resonate with other philosophical traditions, such as those of Indian and Persian origins. More crucially, I urge other scholars to compare and make connections between the various aesthetic traditions of the world, for to delight in the beauty of the world in which we live surely transcends cultural, historical, and philosophical borders. The fact that the term "aesthetic" can be construed, understood, and used variously by different philosophers—both within the Western philosophical tradition and in comparison between Western and non-Western ones—does not, to me at least, constitute a "fallacy of equivocation" as Thomas Regelski argues.<sup>104</sup> On the contrary, it testifies to its richness and complexity. Just as terms such as "democracy," "justice," "equality," and even "praxis" take on different shades of meaning—yet continue to illumine music education—

scholars should examine the “aesthetic” with ever-greater intensity for the melioration of music education.<sup>105</sup> Indeed, Regelski’s “aesthetic this, aesthetic that, aesthetic whatever”<sup>106</sup> is precisely what we need to nudge music education forward in this pluralistic world. We have Bennett Reimer to thank for his contribution to an aesthetic philosophy of music education, for North America, and beyond.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Plato, *The Republic*, 376e; Lowell Mason, *Manual of the Boston Academy of Music for Instruction in the Elements of Vocal Music on the System of Pestalozzi* (Boston: Boston Academy of Music, 1834).

<sup>2</sup>Horatio Parker, Osbourne McConathy, Edward Bailey Birge, and Otto Miessner, *The Progressive Music Series, Teacher’s Manual*, vol. 2 (Boston: Silver Burdett and Company, 1916).

<sup>3</sup>James Mursell, “Principles of Music Education,” in *Music Education: The Thirty-Fifth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part Two*, ed. Guy Whipple (Bloomington, Illinois: Public School Publishing, 1936), 6.

<sup>4</sup>See, for example, Abraham Schwadron, *Aesthetics: Dimensions for Music Education* (Washington, DC: Music Educators National Conference, 1967); Charles Leonhard and Robert House, *Foundations and Principles of Music Education*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book, 1972).

<sup>5</sup>Bennett Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education*, 1st ed. (Englewood Cliffs: New Jersey, 1970). See also, Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1989); *A Philosophy of Music Education: Advancing the Vision*, 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 2003).

<sup>6</sup>Abraham A. Schwadron, “Philosophy in Music Education: State of the Research,” *Bulletin of the Council for Research in Music Education* 34 (1973): 49; Douglas C. Lemmon, “Strategy in Bennett Reimer’s *A Philosophy of Music Education*,” *Bulletin of the Council for Research in Music Education* 51 (1977): 8.

<sup>7</sup>See, for example, Wayne Bowman, “The Problem of Aesthetics and Multiculturalism in Music Education,” *Canadian Music Educator* 34, no. 5 (1993): 23–30; David J. Elliott, *Music Matters: A New Philosophy of Music Education* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 29–38; Thomas Regelski, “Prolegomenon to a Praxial Philosophy of Music and Music Education,” *Finnish Journal of Music Education* 1, no. 1 (1996): 35; Scott Goble, *What’s So Important About Music Education?* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 232–233.

<sup>8</sup>In this paper, all citations from the *Analects* follow referencing in accordance with D.C. Lau, *The Analects* (London: Penguin Books, 1979); those from the *Mencius* follow D. C. Lau, *Mencius* (London: Penguin Books, 2004); those from the *Xunzi* follow D.C. Lau, Ho Che Wah, and Chen Fong Ching, *A Concordance to the Xunzi* (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1996).

<sup>9</sup>Reimer, “Music Education in China: An Overview and Some Issues,” *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 23, no. 1 (1989): 70.

<sup>10</sup>Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education—Advancing the Vision (The Third Edition)*, Chinese Edition (Beijing: People’s Music Publishing House, 2011), 5.

<sup>11</sup>Much has been written on Chinese aesthetics. See, for example, Cai Zhongde 蔡仲德, *Zhong guo yin yue mei xue shi* 中国音乐美学史 (*History of Aesthetics of Chinese Music*) (Beijing: Renmin yinyue chubanshe, 2003).

<sup>12</sup>Reimer, *A Philosophy*, 1st ed., 164.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>14</sup>*Analects* 8.8.

<sup>15</sup>Richard Shusterman, "Pragmatist Aesthetics and Confucianism," *The Journal of Aesthetic Education* 43, no. 1 (2009): 20. On Confucian self-cultivation through music, see Leonard Tan, "Towards a Transcultural Philosophy of Instrumental Music Education" (Ph.D diss., Indiana University, 2012), 69–73.

<sup>16</sup>Li Zehou, *The Chinese Aesthetic Tradition*, trans. Maija Bell Samei (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2010), 40, 52. See also, David Hall and Roger Ames, *Thinking Through Confucius* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), who claim that the Confucian order is fundamentally aesthetic.

<sup>17</sup>Reimer, *A Philosophy*, 1st ed., 10, 29; Karl-Heinz Pohl, "Chinese Aesthetics and Kant," in *The Pursuit of Comparative Aesthetics: An Interface Between East and West*, eds. Mazhar Hussain and Robert Wilkinson (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2006), 127.

<sup>18</sup>On a critique of the notion of "art works" in Reimer's writings, see for example, Elliott, *Music Matters*, ch. 2. For a critique of Elliott's construal of Goehr, see Elvira Panaiotidi, "What is Music? Aesthetic Experience Versus Musical Practice," *Philosophy of Music Education Review*, 11, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 73–76.

<sup>19</sup>See for example, Jane Cauvel, "The Transformative Power of Art: Li Zehou's Aesthetic Theory," *Philosophy East and West* 49, no. 2 (1999): 160–161; Pohl, "Chinese Aesthetics," 128.

<sup>20</sup>Li Zehou, *The Path of Beauty: A Study of Chinese Aesthetics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

<sup>21</sup>Hsin Kwan-chue, "Confucian and Western Aesthetics: A Brief Comparative Study," in *The Pursuit of Comparative Aesthetics*, 161; Zhang Qian, "The Boundaries of Beauty in Pre-Qin Confucian Aesthetics," *Frontiers of Philosophy in China*, 4, no. 1 (2009): 53. Zhuangzi expands the scope of beauty to include the ugly. See Li, *Chinese Aesthetic*, 93.

<sup>22</sup>Kwang-ming Wu, "Aesthetics," in *Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy*, ed. Antonio S. Cua (New York: Routledge, 2003): 1. On the Chinese conception of dynamic, moral beauty (*yanggang zhi mei*), see Li, *Chinese Aesthetic*, 61.

<sup>23</sup>Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education*, 1st ed., 24. Reimer further cites Langer who notes that "the joy of revelation . . . is simply the joy of great art, which is the perception of created form wholly expressive, that is to say, beautiful." See *ibid.*, 85.

<sup>24</sup>Li, *Chinese Aesthetic*, 8.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, 224. See also, *Mencius* 4A.7.

<sup>27</sup>Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education*, 1st ed., 102–103.

<sup>28</sup>According to Reimer, *A Philosophy*, 1st ed., 103, "good" music has structural refinement and deep expressive content.



<sup>29</sup>*Analects* 3.25; 7.14

<sup>30</sup>*Analects* 7.14

<sup>31</sup>Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education*, 1st ed., 37–39.

<sup>32</sup>The ideas in this paragraph are drawn from *ibid.*, 7, 32, 64–65, 100; 2nd ed., 33, 43, 92.

<sup>33</sup>Reimer quotes Langer: “Because the forms of human feeling are much more congruent with musical forms than with the forms of language, music can reveal the nature of feelings with a detail and truth that language cannot approach.” See Reimer, *A Philosophy*, 2nd ed., 50. Reimer also draws on Dewey, who notes that “if all meanings could be adequately expressed by words, the arts of painting and music would not exist.” See Reimer, *A Philosophy*, 1st ed., 31.

<sup>34</sup>Contra the ancient Greeks who see language as “truth tool,” Confucius famously expresses his fundamental mistrust of language in his rather vitriolic declaration: “I detest glib talkers!” (*Analects*: 11.25). On the limitations of language in the *Zhuangzi*, see Li, *Chinese Aesthetic*, 92, 105–107.

<sup>35</sup>Li, *Chinese Aesthetic*, 107.

<sup>36</sup>See for example, Li, *Chinese Aesthetic*, 57. On how Langer is “relatively close” to traditional Chinese aesthetic thought, see *ibid.*, 21.

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid.*, 31. In Chinese aesthetics, even time is emotionalized. *Ibid.*, 55–56.

<sup>38</sup>On *Qing* as the aesthetic foundation of Confucian music, see Johanna Liu, “Art and Aesthetics of Music in Classical Confucianism,” in *Dao Companion to Classical Confucian Philosophy*, ed. V. Shen (Netherlands: Springer, 2014), 235–237. On how music shapes human emotions directly, see Li, *Chinese Aesthetic*, xi, ch. 1.

<sup>39</sup>Reimer, *A Philosophy*, 3rd ed., ch. 3.

<sup>40</sup>Roger Ames, “Confucianism and Deweyan Pragmatism,” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 30, no. 3/4 (2003): 406, 413–414. See also, Iris M. Yob, “The Cognitive Emotions and Emotional Cognitions,” *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 16, no. 1 (1997): 43–57.

<sup>41</sup>Qingping Liu, “Emotionales in Confucianism and Daoism: A New Interpretation,” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 38, no. 1 (2011): 118–133.

<sup>42</sup>Li, *Chinese Aesthetic*, 33. Feeling can be both individual and collective at the same time through a process of what Li Zehou calls “sedimentation” (*jidian*): the “accumulation and condensation of the social, rational, and historical to become something individualistic, sensuous, and intuitive.” *Ibid.*, x.

<sup>43</sup>Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education*, 1st ed., 50–51. See also, 73 and 84. Reimer’s emphasis on the joy of music (p. 6) is further related to Xunzi’s declaration that “music is joy” as expressed in 20/98/14 of the *Xunzi*.

<sup>44</sup>Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education*, 1st ed., 50.

<sup>45</sup>See for example, Bowman, “Problem of Aesthetics,” 25; Elliott, *Music Matters*, 36; Regelski, “Prolegomenon to a Praxial Philosophy,” 34–35. Perhaps as a response to the criticisms, Reimer foregrounds the Deweyan conception of the aesthetic experience in the third edition of his text: he defines an aesthetic experience in Deweyan terms right at the outset, and even proposes an “experience-based” philosophy of music education. See Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education*, 3rd ed., 7–8, 69.

<sup>46</sup>As Regelski argues, Dewey is “anti-Kantian.” See Regelski, “Curriculum: Implications of Aesthetic versus Praxial Philosophies,” in *Praxial Music Education*, ed. David J. Elliott (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 242.

<sup>47</sup>In so doing, I am not at all suggesting that all aspects of Deweyan and Kantian theories of the aesthetic experience are consonant with one another, only that the aspects discussed by Reimer when put together are not logically inconsistent.

<sup>48</sup>For the absence of dualistic thinking in Classical China, see J. Randall Groves, “Mind, Causation, and Chinese Mentality,” *Comparative Civilizations Review* 58, no. 58 (2008): 21–35.

<sup>49</sup>On a dialectical approach to music education, see Estelle Jorgensen, “A Dialectical View of Theory and Practice,” *Journal of Research in Music Education* 49, no. 4 (2001): 343–359.

<sup>50</sup>Reimer, *A Philosophy*, 1st ed., 75–76; 2nd ed., 103.

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup>Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 89–127.

<sup>53</sup>Richard Shusterman, *Pragmatist Aesthetics – Living Beauty, Rethinking Art*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 8–9.

<sup>54</sup>It must be noted that Reimer draws sharp distinctions between the utilitarian and aesthetic philosophies of music education primarily in the first two editions of his text. See Reimer, *A Philosophy*, 1st ed., 23, 43, 69, 83, 92; 2nd ed., xii, 57, 63, 96, 110. In the third edition (p. 65), he shifts his position, and argues that an utilitarian / aesthetic divide is “fruitless and self-defeating.”

<sup>55</sup>Reimer also mentions Abraham Maslow’s “self-actualization,” Susanne Langer’s “personal identity,” Leonard Meyer’s “individualization,” Carl Jung’s “individuation,” and Paul Tillich’s “integration of the personality.” See Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education*, 1st ed., 26, and also, xi, 39.

<sup>56</sup>For example, Elliott in *Music Matters*, 36, notes that “past philosophy holds, illogically, that aesthetic experience is and is not utilitarian.”

<sup>57</sup>See for example, Liu, “Art and Aesthetics,” 233–235; Tan, “Transcultural Philosophy,” 66–73.

<sup>58</sup>*Analects* 8.8.

<sup>59</sup>*Analects* 8.15.

<sup>60</sup>See my contribution in Michael Mark, *Music Education: Source Readings from Ancient Greece to Today*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013), xii–xiii, where even Mozi, who wrote a polemic “Against Music” as music for him wastes state resources, nonetheless acknowledges that music delights the senses.

<sup>61</sup>*Analects* 3.25. On how beauty and moral goodness are often interconnected in Confucianism, see *Analects* 3.3, 4.1, and 17.11.

<sup>62</sup>On this point, I am indebted to Christian Helmut Wenzel’s analysis in his “Beauty in Kant and Confucius: A First Step,” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 33, no. 1 (2006): 98–99. See also, Hsin, “Confucian and Western Aesthetics,” 168; Zhang, “Boundaries of Beauty,” 54.

<sup>63</sup>*Analects* 15.11.

<sup>64</sup>Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education*, 1st ed., 95; 2nd ed., 113.

<sup>65</sup>Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education*, 1st ed., 76.

<sup>66</sup>*Ibid.*, 80–81.

<sup>67</sup>As a pragmatist, Shusterman leans towards the Deweyan conception and is critical of Kant. See his *Pragmatist Aesthetics*, 8–10, 52, 156, 287–288.

<sup>68</sup>*Analects* 7.14. On the importance of listening in the Confucian tradition, see Tu, “Embodied Knowledge,” 5.

<sup>69</sup>Reimer, *A Philosophy*, 2nd ed., 107–108.

<sup>70</sup>Reimer, *A Philosophy*, 1st ed., 82–83, 122–123; 2nd ed., 109.

<sup>71</sup>On the immediacy and intensity of the aesthetic experience, see Reimer, *A Philosophy*, 1st ed., 33, 60, 77. The intensity of the aesthetic experience in this present passage (*Analects* 7.14) parallels the earlier cited passage whereby Confucius exclaims “Overflowing—how they fill the ear!” (*Analects* 8.15) upon hearing the music of Master Zhi, which Jeffrey Richey describes as a “rapture.” See Richey, “Ascetics and Aesthetics in the *Analects*,” *Numen* (2000): 167.

<sup>72</sup>As Li Zehou notes, the ancient Chinese aesthetic experience is “inseparable from perception” and always focuses on the “fundamentally sensuous nature of beauty.” See Li, *Chinese Aesthetic*, 10.

<sup>73</sup>See Edward Slingerland, *Confucius Analects* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2003), 68. For another use of “three months,” see *Analects*: 6.7.

<sup>74</sup>Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education*, 2nd ed., 113.

<sup>75</sup>Translation mine. For a published translation, see Wing-Tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), 86. My translation of *lǜ* (慮) is consistent with Hsin, “Confucian and Western Aesthetics,” 167. See also, pages 174–175, where Hsin notes that one of the values of studying poetry, for Confucius, is “contemplation” (*Analects* 7.9).

<sup>76</sup>John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 1934/2005), ch. 1.

<sup>77</sup>Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education*, 1st ed., 23. See also, 74–75; 2nd ed., 102, 113.

<sup>78</sup>I have unpacked this in greater detail in Tan, “Transcultural Philosophy,” 162–165.

<sup>79</sup>By “continuity thesis,” I refer to the reinterpretation of traditional mutually exclusive categories as “working distinctions” that are instead poles on a continuum. See Richard Shusterman, “Why Dewey Now?” *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 23, no. 3 (1989): 60–67.

<sup>80</sup>Dewey, *Art as Experience*, 3.

<sup>81</sup>On butchering an ox, see “The Tale of Cook Ding” in Angus C. Graham, *Chuang-Tzu – the Inner Chapters* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2001), 63–65. On how art connects with life in Chinese aesthetics, see Li, *Chinese Aesthetic*, x, 90, 115.

<sup>82</sup>Tu, “Embodied Knowledge,” 4–5.

<sup>83</sup>Shusterman, *Pragmatist Aesthetics*, 140.

<sup>84</sup>*Analects* 15.11

<sup>85</sup>Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 225–228.

<sup>86</sup>The summary of ideas in this paragraph is drawn from Reimer, *A Philosophy*, 2nd ed., 138–140.

<sup>87</sup>Tan, “Transcultural Philosophy,” 134–135. See also, Leonard Tan, “Confucian *Creatio in Situ*—Philosophical Resource for a Theory of Creativity in Instrumental Music Education,” *Music Education Research*, ahead-of-print (2015): 1–18.

<sup>88</sup>See for example, *Analects* 4.10; 9.4; 15.37.

<sup>89</sup>*Analects* 4.10. Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont, *The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation* (New York: Ballantine Publishing Group, 1998), 91. See also, *Mencius*: 4B.19.

<sup>90</sup>*Analects* 15.11.

<sup>91</sup>Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education*, 2nd ed., 140.

<sup>92</sup>The sketch of ideas in this paragraph is drawn from Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education*, 3rd ed., 123–125.

<sup>93</sup>*Ibid.*, 123.

<sup>94</sup>*Ibid.*, 125.

<sup>95</sup>Roger Ames, *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011).

<sup>96</sup>Tan, “Transcultural Philosophy,” 139–140.

<sup>97</sup>Hall and Ames, *Thinking Through Confucius*, 237–238; Sor-hoon Tan, *Confucian Democracy: A Deweyan Reconstruction* (Albany: State University of New York, 2003), 30–31.

<sup>98</sup>On trust, see *Analects*: 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.13, 2.22, 5.26, 5.28, 9.25, 12.10, 13.4, 15.6, 17.6, 19.10, and 20.1.

<sup>99</sup>Ames, “Confucianism,” 411. See also, Li, *Chinese Aesthetic*, 195.

<sup>100</sup>*Analects*: 4.15. See also, 15.24, 5.12, 12.2, 6.30, and Robert Eno, *Confucian Creation of Heaven* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 66–68.

<sup>101</sup>Reimer, *A Philosophy*, 3rd ed., 127.

<sup>102</sup>Ames, “Confucianism and Deweyan Pragmatism,” 405.

<sup>103</sup>Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), 146–147.

<sup>104</sup>Thomas Regelski, “Response to Philip Alperson’s ‘Robust Praxialism and the Anti-Aesthetic Turn,’” *Philosophy of Music Education Review* 18, no. 2 (Fall 2010): 200–201.

<sup>105</sup>On how we should similarly not give up on the term “democracy” in instrumental music education, but should instead, as Dewey would encourage us, press on with “energy and sincerity,” see Leonard Tan, “Towards a Transcultural Theory of Democracy for Instrumental Music Education,” *Philosophy of Music Education Review* 22, no. 1 (2014): 71.

<sup>106</sup>Regelski, “Response to Alperson,” 200.

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