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## Reading John Dewey's *Art as Experience* for Music Education

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### Abstract

In this paper, I offer my reading of John Dewey's *Art as Experience* and propose implications for music education based on Dewey's ideas. Three principal questions guide my task: What are some key ideas in Dewey's theory of art? How does Dewey's theory of art fit within his larger theory of experience? What are the implications of Dewey's ideas for music education? As I shall show, art for Dewey is rooted in nature, civilizes humans, serves as social glue, and has an important role in society throughout most of human history. Modern life, however, separates art and life; there is a need to restore the continuity between art and the ordinary processes of living, a task that Dewey undertakes by positing the notion of art as experience. Dewey's ideas support an expanded curriculum in music education, one in which popular music may be included alongside Western classical music and music from diverse cultures. However, artistic and educational discernment are needed, which necessitates the need for music educators to be sufficiently steeped in varied musical traditions and styles.

Keywords: John Dewey, Art, Experience, Aesthetics, Music Education

John Dewey's *Art as Experience* has enriched the philosophy of music education, having been mined by authors such as Bennett Reimer, David Elliott, Estelle Jorgensen, and Heidi Westerlund.<sup>1</sup> Given the richness of the text, however, much remains to be read, re-read, and critically examined for music education. In this paper, I offer my reading of this seminal text and propose implications for music education based on Dewey's ideas. Three principal questions guide and structure this paper: What are some key ideas in Dewey's theory of art? How does Dewey's theory of art fit within his larger theory of experience? What are the implications of Dewey's ideas for music education? While *Art as Experience* remain the central focus in this paper, I also make connections to similar themes found in other writings by Dewey, as well as the work of Richard Shusterman who extended and developed Dewey's aesthetic ideas in *Pragmatist Aesthetics* amongst others.<sup>2</sup>

### Dewey's Theory of Art

What are some key ideas in Dewey's theory of art?<sup>3</sup> I find it striking that Dewey titles the first chapter of *Art as Experience*, "The Live Creature," as if alluding to the natural world. Indeed, Dewey posits that art has deep roots in nature, arguing "naturalism in the broadest and deepest sense of nature is a necessity of all great art." Dewey does not restrict his construal of nature to the physical world, such as water, the sky, and earth, but includes natural laws such as energy, tension, and release.<sup>4</sup> In making the connection between art and nature, Dewey naturalizes the aesthetic experience and situates art in the immanent rather than the transcendental world.<sup>5</sup> While humans use art to tie to nature, they also use art to distinguish themselves from nature.<sup>6</sup> Although art is a continuation of nature, art is not nature per se, but nature transformed into an expressive medium that elicits emotional responses and gives shape

and meaning to human life.<sup>7</sup> In particular, music, with sound as its medium, “agitates directly, as a commotion of the organism itself,” and expresses in a concentrated way “the shocks and instabilities” and “the conflicts and resolutions” of nature and human life.<sup>8</sup>

Dewey argues that two important principles of nature are crucial in art: rhythm and symmetry.<sup>9</sup> For Dewey, even though rhythm and symmetry are conceptually distinct, they are two modalities of the same process; one cannot do without the other. Examples in nature and life include day and night, the seasons, waking and sleeping, and systole and diastole.<sup>10</sup> Since they are natural laws that underlie the course of life, humans impose them on art. As these laws are derived from the natural world, they are not static but dynamic: rhythm in art is neither mechanical like the clock (the “tick-tock” theory) nor a mere repetition of beats (the “tom-tom” theory), but constant variation whereby energies accumulate in a work of art.<sup>11</sup> Similarly, symmetry is not static but a dynamic process of balancing energies accumulated through rhythm. When we feel movement, we are aware of rhythm; conversely, when we feel rest, we are aware of symmetry. Exemplary art is rooted in natural laws: in an aesthetically complete work, rhythm and symmetry work hand in glove and are inextricably linked. In an aesthetically incomplete work, however, rhythm and symmetry fall apart: there are too many “holes and dead spots” on the one hand (that is, too much rest), and several “unmotivated and unresolved excitations” on the other (that is, too much movement). Accordingly, Dewey argues “the final measure of balance or symmetry is the capacity of the whole to hold together within itself the greatest variety and scope of opposed elements.”<sup>12</sup>

To my reading, it is clear that for Dewey, nature begets art, and art begets civility.<sup>13</sup> He posits that “neither the savage nor the civilized man (sic) is what he is by native constitution but by the culture in which he participates.”<sup>14</sup> Humans are not innately civilized, but are made so

through art, which influences humans more directly than the teaching of precepts through words.<sup>15</sup> For Dewey, art consolidates meanings accrued by civilizations over time and enables the continuity of culture.<sup>16</sup> It creates ideals, instructs, and communicates values through the imagination. He argues that art is humanity's greatest intellectual accomplishment which not only manifests, records, and celebrates the life of a civilization, but is also the final measure of its quality.<sup>17</sup> Dewey's stand here differs from analytic philosophers who see science as the paradigm and ideal of human achievement.<sup>18</sup> In fact, the relationship between art and civilization is so important to Dewey that he devotes the entire closing chapter of *Art as Experience* to it.<sup>19</sup>

Since art has deep roots in nature and civilizes humans, Dewey notes that it has had an important role in society throughout most of human history. This was especially apparent in antiquity, when art enhanced the processes of daily life and there was little separation between fine and useful art. For example, domestic utensils, house furnishings, mats, rugs, bows and spears were made with so much care that they were both art and useful objects.<sup>20</sup> For Dewey, art played an important role in community life and served as an effective form of social glue. It extended "the power of rites and ceremonies" to unite humans through a shared celebration and brought about a sense of religious communion.<sup>21</sup> In particular, music brought different individuals together in a "common surrender, loyalty and inspiration," submerged the barriers erected by language, and enabled human beings to participate in shared universes of value and meaning.<sup>22</sup>

Dewey laments, however, that modern society creates a chasm between art and life. In particular, art today is set so high up on a pedestal that it is now remote from daily living for most people, a problem he terms the "museum conception of art."<sup>23</sup> The mechanical mass production of commercial objects in contemporary society intensifies the division between fine

and useful art.<sup>24</sup> The growth of museums as a result of nationalism, imperialism, and capitalism further contributes to the separation of art and life. In the process, art today is reduced to the “the beauty parlor of civilization.”<sup>25</sup> For Dewey, the solution is to construe art no longer as vaulted relics on the distant past, but as part of ordinary experience.

### Art as Experience

How does Dewey’s theory of art fit within his larger theory of experience?<sup>26</sup> For Dewey, experience is simply the manner in which organisms interact with their environments.<sup>27</sup> Experience is often “inchoate” as there is distraction or dispersion, and the parts do not relate to the whole.<sup>28</sup> For Dewey, such experiences are not imbued with vitality and are “anesthetic.”<sup>29</sup> Occasionally, however, experience reaches fulfillment and consummates, as when one arrives at a solution to a problem or has “that meal at a Paris restaurant.” When this happens, experience is no longer fragmented, but unified, integrated, self-sufficient, individualized, perceived as a whole, and reaches a rounded closure. Dewey calls this a “consummatory experience” or “*an* experience.”<sup>30</sup> Since every part of *an* experience flows to the next seamlessly and reaches fulfillment through ordered and organized movement, *an* experience has an aesthetic quality.<sup>31</sup>

For Dewey, however, the aesthetic quality of *an* experience in ordinary living remains an aesthetic experience “in the raw.”<sup>32</sup> To encounter the aesthetic experience in its “refined and intensified” or “ultimate and approved” forms, one turns to “intentionally cultivated” forms of aesthetic experience—art.<sup>33</sup> Art refines, intensifies, concentrates, clarifies, crystallizes, and foregrounds the aesthetic quality of *an* experience in ordinary living.<sup>34</sup> It is a “pure” experience. As we delight in it, we “forget ourselves.”<sup>35</sup>

Notwithstanding the distinction between an aesthetic experience “in the raw” and an aesthetic experience “refined,” Dewey maintains that “in order to understand the esthetic in its ultimate and approved forms, one must begin with it in the raw.”<sup>36</sup> In looking for aspects of our daily lives that may have an aesthetic quality, which includes taken for granted sounds and sights such as machines drilling holes and the delight of housewives (sic) tending their plants, we heighten our consciousness of what it means to have an aesthetic experience through art.<sup>37</sup> In other words, Dewey does not wish to reify art but seeks organic connections between the “raw” and the “refined.”<sup>38</sup>

I surmise, therefore, that Dewey’s theory of experience may be construed as a continuum with anesthetic experience on the one end, moving through the raw to the refined form of the aesthetic experience on the other.<sup>39</sup> The continuum is to the degree that experience incorporates unity; a true aesthetic experience is one that is maximally unified.<sup>40</sup> On the one hand, this theory of experience enables Dewey to create continuity between art and ordinary living. While one may obtain an aesthetic experience via art, an aesthetic experience is not found solely in art, but may be found in everyday living. On the other hand, Dewey’s theory of experience enables art to remain an aesthetic and satisfying end in itself.<sup>41</sup> Art enables humans to have aesthetic experiences in their refined forms, which ordinary experiences, even when consummated, cannot provide.<sup>42</sup> While one may obtain an aesthetic experience via “that meal at a Paris restaurant,” aesthetic experience is at its most unified, heightened, distilled, and dwelled upon state in art.<sup>43</sup> Since experience is often inchoate and lacks unity and meaning, art elevates, transforms, and meliorates life.<sup>44</sup> As Dewey notes, art “satisfies many ends, none of which is laid down in advance. It serves life.”<sup>45</sup>

Indeed, the notion of art serving life is central to Dewey. Dewey's theory of art as experience posits that art has aesthetic standing only if humans obtain aesthetic experiences through art. This theory distinguishes between the "art product," which refers to the actual art object (for example, a painting, poem, or statue), and the "*work of art*," which refers to what the art product does or its *working* (that is, the aesthetic experience that humans obtain when they interact with the art product).<sup>46</sup> For example, Haydn's *London Symphony* is not merely an art product to be appreciated in a sonic museum for its formal beauty. When an orchestra performs the work, appreciation of the symphony is not restricted to the so-called "cultivated" or those who can "contemplate" its form. There is no univocal notion of aesthetic experience. Rather, listeners interact with the music according to their own lived experiences. As listeners actively attend to and artistically construct the symphony in their imagination ("doing"), they are at the same time at the receiving end of aesthetic pleasure ("undergoing"). For Dewey, this balance of "doing" and "undergoing" creates an "artistic-aesthetic" experience or "aesthetic experience" in short.<sup>47</sup> From a Deweyan perspective, listeners gain broadened perspectives and acquire new insights through interaction with Haydn's symphony.<sup>48</sup> In stressing art as experience that meliorates life rather than art as "superfine and extraneous polish" that only the "cultivated" can grasp, Dewey renders art for all.<sup>49</sup>

Simultaneously, Dewey posits the notion of "experience as art."<sup>50</sup> While aesthetic experiences can be obtained via interaction with established art forms, they are not there solely. Instead, a variety of everyday activities, which for Dewey includes movies, jazz, and comics, can be rich in aesthetic values.<sup>51</sup> By situating aesthetic possibilities in daily living, the aesthetics become part of a continuum that includes normal, everyday experience.<sup>52</sup> Art, for Dewey, should not reflect and serve only the interests of the elite, but also those of the working class.<sup>53</sup> This



suggests that art cannot be secure in modern civilization unless the material is drawn from all sources and rendered accessible to all, which suggests several fruitful implications for music education.

### Implications for Music Education

What are the implications of Dewey's ideas for music education? Given the Deweyan democratization of art, one would expect that this view lends support to popular music in schools. Commenting on the historical focus on elite art, Dewey laments that "popular arts must have flourished," but they "were not worthy of mention in theoretical discussion."<sup>54</sup> For Dewey, the presence of works of art that are close to common life and widely enjoyed in a community are signs of a unified collective life and can also help to create a unified community.<sup>55</sup> Dewey, however, warns against "best-sellers" that have "immediate vogue." These products are "easy" and "thus make a quick appeal; their popularity calls out imitators, and they set the fashion in plays or novels or songs for a time." However, "their very ready assimilation into experience exhausts them quickly; no new stimulus is derived from them. They have their day—and only a day."<sup>56</sup> For Dewey, "the 'eternal' quality of great art is its renewed instrumentality for further consummatory experiences."<sup>57</sup> He highlights Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony* and argues that it has the "power, strength, and solidity—like a massive, well-constructed bridge of stone" to "express the enduring, that which is structurally resistant."<sup>58</sup> He considers "the great symphonies of Beethoven" to have "spiritual values" and declares that they are "virtual additions to the world's riches; they are ideal."<sup>59</sup>

Dewey's comments on Beethoven's music is consistent with his theory of aesthetics: art refines and transforms the rawness of ordinary life into a spiritual experience.<sup>60</sup> In his writings,

Dewey shows a strong interest in the student's intellect and mind. Educators are responsible for developing intelligent minds as democracy cannot function without them.<sup>61</sup> For the Deweyan, therefore, while popular music definitely has a place in schools, this has to be approached critically. Such a critical stance should be taken towards classical music as well. Dewey warns against hardening the past into customs such that it becomes "dead wood from the past" that inhibits growth.<sup>62</sup> As Estelle Jorgensen reminds us, even what has come to be accepted as canon should not be "freeze-dried."<sup>63</sup>

Dewey's aim is neither to uphold the past nor to disrupt it, but to establish continuity.<sup>64</sup> The point is neither a blind conservation of Western classical music nor an outright removal of it from the curricula, but to see value in its ability to create cultural continuity.<sup>65</sup> Richard Shusterman argues that the differences between popular and classical music are in part socially and historically constructed, and the status of an artwork and even an entire genre can change with time.<sup>66</sup> What we know today as "classical music," such as Baroque dance suites, were popular during their time.<sup>67</sup> In other words, "classical music" emerges out of "popular music." While the categories of classical and popular music may be useful as Deweyan "working distinctions," they should not be conceived in dualistic terms.<sup>68</sup> By extension, classical and popular music may complement each other in the curriculum. On the one hand, teaching classical music enriches students' understanding of popular music.<sup>69</sup> Music educators may teach Bach chorales and show how the progression I–ii<sup>6</sup>–V<sup>7</sup>–I can also be seen in music of the Beatles. On the other hand, teaching popular music enhances students' understanding of classical music. A band director may rehearse an arrangement of "In the Mood" and point out how the "walking bass" has historical precedents in Corelli's trio sonatas.

In short, while Deweyan democratization of art lends explicit support to popular music, a Deweyan approach to music education does not construe classical and popular music in mutually exclusive but continuous and complementary terms. As Dewey exhorts, education is about maintaining a balance between the formal and the informal.<sup>70</sup> From a Deweyan perspective, teachers should avoid taking either-or approaches; instead, they should embrace both genres judiciously and critically.<sup>71</sup>

A similar approach, one that avoids either-or, may also be taken when negotiating the tension between what Jorgensen terms music of the “great” and “little” traditions.<sup>72</sup> For Jorgensen, while “great” traditions are those that have developed an international audience and are often revered as highly developed works of art and culture, “little” traditions tend to be localized, restricted to specific social classes and ethnicities, and not necessarily considered great works of art.<sup>73</sup> On the one hand, one may argue that as Western classical music has achieved global ubiquity, it is a universal language, transcends culture, and ought to be taught worldwide. As Jorgensen notes, Western art music “has become a truly international musical language, a great musical tradition understood by people all over the world.”<sup>74</sup> In like vein, Brenda Brenner argues that familiarity with the Western canon and an ability to read and perform music at a rudimentary level “should be part of the general education of a cultured society.”<sup>75</sup> On the other hand, Christopher Small argues that Western classical music appeals only to a very small percentage of the world’s population.<sup>76</sup> Contra Jorgensen, Scott Goble claims that the notion of Western classical music as international language is ethnocentric as it does not adequately acknowledge the various perspectives and musical practices of different cultural communities. For Goble, the emphasis on Western classical music is often done at the expense of folk musics.<sup>77</sup> Richard Kraus asserts that “the international language myth arises only from the

perspective of powerful nations, whose often well-intentioned citizens need to prettify their cultural influence over weaker people.”<sup>78</sup>

Shusterman, however, does not read ideological notions into the ontological essence of art. Instead, he situates the root causes of the oppression in what the nineteenth-century socio-cultural elite did with art. For Shusterman, it is the institution of high art, not high art itself that is elitist and oppressive.<sup>79</sup> Through association with high art, the elite claims intrinsic superiority in taste and sensibility over the masses as a means to assert its own supremacy.<sup>80</sup> Shusterman warns, however, that it would be misguided to treat art as “an enemy of the people.”<sup>81</sup> The fact that Haydn wrote for the aristocrats who strove to continue their social domination should not imply that we should refrain from teaching Haydn’s music to our students. In fact, it is undemocratic *not* to teach it. Foster McMurray argues the assumption that art music can only be appreciated by the elite is neither democratic nor egalitarian. We should not be “stingy” about it and reserve it for only a fortunate few.<sup>82</sup> Instead of viewing classical music in ideological terms, one may view it in pragmatic terms whereby teachers utilize it as a tool for teaching and learning. Since classical music has often been approached in ways that set it apart from ordinary lived life, I propose seeing it pragmatically as a way of conjoining the continuity between this music and ordinary living. As Shusterman reminds us, “art’s social import depends on how it is appropriated and deployed, and we should be able to appropriate works of high art to promote progressive socio-ethical aims.”<sup>83</sup> If people can appropriate classical music in oppressive ways, they can also render it in educationally pragmatic ways.

One useful aspect of Western classical music that a teacher may teach is form. Although pragmatism is opposed to formalism<sup>84</sup> and the conception of form as eternal, fixed Platonic-like Ideas that can be abstracted from actual works of art, it is not opposed to form per se. Instead,

pragmatism sees form in functional terms, that is, as a means of creating an aesthetic experience.<sup>85</sup> Construed as such, form cannot be dissociated from matter.<sup>86</sup> Orchestral directors may illustrate how form is not a fixed, static mold, but a flexible means of creating an aesthetic experience by programming the first movements of Haydn's Symphony no. 104 and Mozart's Symphony no. 41 side by side. Although both composers make use of sonata forms in their respective works, they do so in different ways, and directors may explain the differences as they rehearse.<sup>87</sup> Their students make use of what they have learned and apply them in their own compositions and listening experiences. The Deweyan insight that form is functional, dynamic, and inextricably linked to matter can also be applied to students' understanding of forms in non-Western art. For example, students can better appreciate how the 16-beat *ketawang* form in Javanese gamelan music is present not as an end in itself, but as a means towards creating the aesthetic experience.<sup>88</sup> This brings me to my next theme: the transcultural nature of the aesthetic experience.

As noted at the beginning of this essay, art, for Dewey, has deep roots in nature. Since nature knows no cultural boundaries, it provides a foundation for a transcultural theory of art. As Dewey elegantly asks, "how many poems are there in all languages having flowers, or even the rose, for their 'subject'?" Art often deals with "the common things of the world," albeit "experienced in different cultures and different personalities."<sup>89</sup> Importantly for Dewey, "so far as in each case there is an ordered movement of the matter of the experience to a fulfillment, there is a dominant esthetic quality. *Au fond*, the esthetic quality is the same for Greek, Chinese, and American."<sup>90</sup> Insofar as experience consummates in one's interaction with a work of art, the aesthetic experience is *au fond* or "at bottom" the same regardless of where the art originates. Listening to Indian sitar virtuoso Ustad Sharafat Khan perform *Raag Rageshree* at the

Mariamman Temple in Singapore was for me no less intense and fulfilling than listening to the Chicago Symphony Orchestra perform Beethoven's Seventh Symphony at the Symphony Hall in Chicago. An aesthetic experience does not lie within the sole province of Western classical music. There is no reason why Western classical music should necessarily be construed as being intrinsically oppressive; it is just another means of arriving at an aesthetic experience. In this regard, I align my work with Shusterman's position that although the term "aesthetic" was originally used to refer to "high art and the most refined appreciation of nature," pragmatism liberates the word from such narrow definitions. It no longer refers only to distanced, disinterested contemplation of forms, but a dynamic and immediate consummatory experience.<sup>91</sup> Still, Dewey does not deny differences between cultures. Returning to his quote, "*au fond*" or "at bottom," the aesthetic experience is the same regardless of culture, which suggests that there are differences at the surface levels. For Dewey, "every culture has its own collective individuality."<sup>92</sup> However, the differences are not impenetrable. On the contrary, going beyond surface differences and excavating to the bottom promote inter-cultural understanding and mutually enhance cultures.

I am struck by Dewey's use of the metaphor of friendship to illustrate how intercultural aesthetic appreciation may be achieved.<sup>93</sup> In a genuine friendship, friends see through each other's eyes and hear through each other's ears. The key to aesthetic appreciation of art from a foreign culture for Dewey is to imaginatively take on the "attitudes expressed" in the art of that culture. Art foreign to one's own culture becomes "less local and provincial," and one gains access into the deepest aspects of foreign civilization which broadens and deepens one's own experience.<sup>94</sup> Furthermore, when the art of a foreign culture enters into one's own, "genuine continuity is effected," and a transcultural community that does not exist physically is created.

For Dewey, the transcultural community formed when art from different cultures meet is more civilizing than civilization: while civilization is “uncivil” as it divides humans into nations, races, sects, classes, and cliques that may not communicate with one another, art tears down and transcends these divisions. Art is more civilizing than civilization because it brings together what civilization divides. Remote cultures become “friends” with one another and go beyond surface differences to mutually enhance each other’s cultures.

Dewey’s metaphor of friendship not only supports multicultural music education which embraces a variety of musical traditions, but also interculturalism where students immerse themselves in other traditions and even blend aspects of other traditions with their own.<sup>95</sup> Dewey’s friendship metaphor also suggests that when music from the “great” and “little” traditions meet, it is not necessarily a case of the former oppressing or marginalizing the latter, but a symbiotic relationship.<sup>96</sup> From Deweyan lenses, students exposed to music from both the “great” and “little” traditions experience a rich intermingling of cultures that would not be possible if only one tradition were drawn upon. Students also gain insights into how the marriage of musical traditions may result in new art forms, of which jazz, a confluence of African and European music, is a prime example.<sup>97</sup>

With an expanded curriculum, one that includes popular, classical, and music from diverse cultures, how then, should music be selected? Dewey rejects both extremes of “old education” that imposes curricular decisions from above and ignores the child’s experience, and “new education” that lacks directions and is ultimately “empty” as “nothing can be developed from nothing.”<sup>98</sup> Instead, Dewey uses the metaphor of “the explorer and the map” to capture the ideal relationship between the child and the curriculum. While “the explorer” refers to students,

their interests, the learning processes, and the psychological aspects of learning, “the map” refers to the curriculum, the subject matter, the learning outcomes, and the logical aspects of learning.<sup>99</sup>

From the perspective of the child as “explorer,” teachers make the effort to know their students’ backgrounds, aspirations, impulses, and desires.<sup>100</sup> This is important not only to begin with the child in mind, but also because the child must be ready to explore. For Dewey, whether a work of art works depends largely on what beholders bring with them.<sup>101</sup> Students’ native interest and readiness to explore, however, comprise only half the equation. Curricular guidance from teachers is equally important; they need to create “maps” for the explorer. Faced with numerous options, they need to choose music that can foster growth. For Dewey, a rule-based approach to aesthetic adjudication is ineffective as rules are too general to be applied to individual works of art.<sup>102</sup> Instead, aesthetic adjudication involves sensitive perception, discrimination or analysis, unification or synthesis, and judgment which necessitate venture and hypothesis. However, “no rules” can be laid down with regard to each of these phases.<sup>103</sup>

Regardless, Dewey provides a criterion for aesthetic judgment so that the process is not “mere impressionism.” These criteria are neither rules nor prescriptions, but ideas to ascertain if the music were “aesthetic” or “anesthetic.”<sup>104</sup> Aesthetic pieces are those that consummate and create *an* experience. Every part contributes to the whole and leads listeners towards fulfillment. They display unity in variety, continuity, cumulation, conservation, tension, and anticipation.<sup>105</sup> Anesthetic works, however, are works which do not consummate. While there is experience, it is so “slack and discursive” that it is not *an* experience. Parts are simply means of “passing on” as they do not contribute to the whole, nor do they lead towards fulfillment. The music lacks authentic feeling and is “trivial.”<sup>106</sup>



Ultimately, however, it is what Dewey calls “direct seizure,” where one is immediately struck by the aesthetic quality of an artwork, that occurs first.<sup>107</sup> For Dewey, the sole guarantee that this “direct seizure” is of a high level is that the person experiencing it possesses a corresponding “degree of cultivation.”<sup>108</sup> To cultivate oneself aesthetically, one needs to be immersed in a wide range of traditions and be acquainted with masterpieces as “touchstone(s)” of “sensitiveness.”<sup>109</sup> One acquires a rich background and disciplined insights that guard against premature, one-sided, and biased judgments.<sup>110</sup> Maxine Greene stresses that for Dewey, it is important “for people to plunge into subject matter in order to steep themselves in it, and this is probably more true of works of art than other subject matters.”<sup>111</sup> Through immersions in various musical traditions, teachers acquire the aesthetic sensibility to distinguish between aesthetic and anesthetic works, to choose music that fosters growth, and to draw “maps” for their “explorers.”<sup>112</sup>

### Some Concluding Thoughts

In sum, art for Dewey is rooted in nature, civilizes humans, serves as social glue, and has an important role in society throughout most of human history. Modern life, however, separates art and life; there is a need to restore the continuity between art and the ordinary processes of living, a task that Dewey undertakes by positing the notion of art as experience. Dewey’s ideas support an expanded curriculum in music education, one in which popular music may be included alongside Western classical music and music from diverse cultures. Importantly, this requires a critical—even demanding—approach to selecting music for the classroom. Just because Dewey celebrates Beethoven’s *Fifth* does not imply that all classical music deserves a place in the curriculum; conversely, just because popular arts ought to play a role in contemporary

education does not mean that all popular hits can be included unthinkingly. Rather, artistic and educational discernment are needed, which can only be possible, extending Dewey's ideas, when music educators are sufficiently steeped in varied musical traditions and styles.

To illustrate Dewey's ideas in practice, I appeal to a fictitious school orchestral director. Ms. Livingston considers her students' native interests and readiness to learn, but also creates the curriculum for the students using her own aesthetic judgments informed by careful study of various musical traditions. With the knowledge that an increasing number of students in her orchestra hail from the Japanese community, she goes about researching Japanese orchestral works, reading about Japanese music and culture, and immerses herself in recordings of Japanese music by Hiroshi Ohguri, Yasuhide Ito, and Minoru Miki among others. After a period of time, she begins to acquire a knack for the Japanese musical style and chooses a work that appears aesthetically valuable to her that would complement the rest of her curriculum. In so doing, she takes into account the needs of her students as "explorers" and also draws "maps" for them. Her repertoire choices are teacher- *and* student-centric.

In using Dewey's metaphor of "the explorer and the map" to guide curricular decisions, music educators neither impose materials on their students nor "cave in" blindly to their interests.<sup>113</sup> Instead, their role is subtle and important as they exploit the rich possibilities of blending the needs and interests of the child and the curriculum artfully in situations that are ever-changing. Although it is demanding on teachers in that they need to constantly enrich themselves, grow musically, and make their own decisions, it is also empowering. Teachers do not follow instructions by supposed experts, but draw their own maps for their students. Construed as such, it is perhaps reductionist to label Dewey "child-centered" (especially in ways that portray him as an educator who allows total free rein) without considering how Dewey

emphasizes the importance of the teacher as well.<sup>114</sup> In like vein, it is also simplistic to draw on Dewey to justify the place of popular music in the curriculum while sidestepping his explicit celebration of classical music. For such is the richness of Dewey's ideas that his *oeuvre* bears multiple readings. Indeed, to use Dewey's own words, his writings are by no means "best-sellers" that exhaust quickly; rather, "the 'eternal' quality" of his work lies in its "renewed instrumentality" for further nuanced insights.<sup>115</sup> Future attempts to read Dewey may help in this regard.

## Notes

This article is drawn from the author's Ph.D. dissertation, "Towards a Transcultural Philosophy of Instrumental Music Education," Indiana University, 2012.

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<sup>1</sup> Bennet Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education*, 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River: New Jersey, 2003); David Elliott and Marissa Silverman, *Music Matters: A Philosophy of Music Education*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Estelle R. Jorgensen, *Pictures of Music Education* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011); Heidi Westerlund, "Bridging Experience, Action, and Culture in Music Education" (PhD diss., Sibelius Academy, 2002).

<sup>2</sup> Richard Shusterman, *Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000). See also, Richard Shusterman, "Body Consciousness and Music: Variations on Some Themes," *Action, Criticism, and Theory for Music Education* 9, no. 1 (2010): 92-114.

<sup>3</sup> All references to Dewey's writings in this paper will be based on Jo Ann Boydston's critical edition. See John Dewey, *The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882–1898*, 5 vols., ed. Jo Ann

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Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972); *The Middle Works of John Dewey*, 1899–1924, 15 vols., ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978); *The Later Works of John Dewey*, 1925–1953, 17 vols., ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985).

References will list the title of the book or article, the volume number, followed by the page number.

<sup>4</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 155-156; 335-336.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 52-53; Scott Stroud, *John Dewey and the Artful Life* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011), 4-5.

<sup>6</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 31.

<sup>7</sup> Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, Later Works 1: 291; *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 86; Thomas Alexander, *John Dewey's Theory of Art, Experience and Nature: The Horizons of Feeling* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 269.

<sup>8</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 241-242. See also, Alexander, *John Dewey*, 98.

<sup>9</sup> This discussion draws on Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: ch. 8. See also, Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, Later Works 1: 270; Philip M. Zeltner, *John Dewey's Aesthetic Philosophy* (Amsterdam: Grüner, 1975), ch. 5.

<sup>10</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 152-156.

<sup>11</sup> Dewey further defines rhythm as “ordered variation of changes” (*Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 158). On aesthetic experience and rhythm, see Stroud, *John Dewey and the Artful Life*, 74-87.

<sup>12</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 184.

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<sup>13</sup> For Dewey, the fundamental principles of art are founded on nature, which renders it effective in civilizing humans (i.e., “cultural naturalism”). See Dewey, “Philosophy and Civilization,” *Later Works* 3:3; Thomas Alexander, “Dewey, Dualism, and Naturalism,” in *A Companion to Pragmatism*, eds. John R. Shook and Joseph Margolis (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing; 2006), 189.

<sup>14</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, *Later Works* 10: 347.

<sup>15</sup> In Dewey’s words, compared with the influence of art, “things directly taught by word and precept are pale and ineffectual” (*Ibid.*, 347).

<sup>16</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, *Later Works* 10: 229-330. This is related also to Dewey’s point that humans differ from animals because they preserve their past experiences. See *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, *Middle Works* 12: 80.

<sup>17</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, *Later Works* 10: 31, 229, 339, 347; Alexander, *John Dewey*, xx.

<sup>18</sup> Richard Shusterman, “Why Dewey Now?” *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 23, no. 3 (1989): 63.

<sup>19</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, *Later Works* 10: ch. 14.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 11-13; Alexander, *John Dewey*, 190.

<sup>21</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, *Later Works* 10: 275, 175.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 338; Alexander, *John Dewey*, 269.

<sup>23</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, *Later Works* 10: 11-12. See also, Stroud, *John Dewey and the Artful Life*, ch. 1; Alexander, *John Dewey*, 187.

<sup>24</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, *Later Works* 10: 15; *Democracy and Education*, *Middle Works* 9: ch. 19.

<sup>25</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, *Later Works* 10: 14, 346.

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<sup>26</sup> As Dewey maintains, “to esthetic experience, then, the philosopher must go to understand what experience is” (Ibid., 278). It is worth noting that in *Art as Experience*, Dewey spelled “aesthetic” as “esthetic.”

<sup>27</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 276; *Experience and Nature*, Later Works 1: 5. The term “organism” is Dewey’s and reflects the pragmatist theme, naturalism.

<sup>28</sup> The major points in this discussion are drawn from Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 42-46.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 47.

<sup>30</sup> The italics is Dewey’s. Zeltner notes that the term “*an* experience” is synonymous with “consummatory experience,” and that the former term was specially designed for *Art as Experience*. Zeltner also rightly points out that Dewey “could have avoided much confusion” had he been more careful with his terms. See Zeltner, *John Dewey’s Aesthetic Philosophy*, 17, 23-24. See also, Alexander, *John Dewey*, xix, 115, 202; Noël Carroll, *Beyond Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 49-50; David Fenner, *The Aesthetic Attitude* (New Jersey: Atlantic Highlands, 1996), 6.

<sup>31</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 48.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>33</sup> Zeltner, *John Dewey’s Aesthetic Philosophy*, 4-5, 17; Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 9-10, 87, 121, 167; Alexander, *John Dewey*, 186-187.

<sup>34</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 90, 277; Carroll, *Beyond Aesthetics*, 50.

<sup>35</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 110, 278.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 10-11.

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<sup>38</sup> Zeltner calls the aesthetic experience in the raw the “primary phase of aesthetic experience” and the aesthetic experience refined its “secondary phase.” See Zeltner, *John Dewey’s Aesthetic Philosophy*, 4.

<sup>39</sup> On the one hand, Dewey views art as discrete from ordinary experience; on the one hand, he construes it as a continuum. Dewey’s ideas on this complex relationship is in the nature of a paradox rather than a contradiction. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this insight.

<sup>40</sup> See David Fenner, *Introducing Aesthetics* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), 124-125.

<sup>41</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 140; Shusterman, *Pragmatist Aesthetics*, 9; Philip W. Jackson, *John Dewey and the Lessons of Art* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 5.

<sup>42</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 90; Zeltner, *John Dewey’s Aesthetic Philosophy*, 3.

<sup>43</sup> Bertram Morris, “Dewey’s Theory of Art,” in *Guide to the Works of John Dewey*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1970), 167; Zeltner, *John Dewey’s Aesthetic Philosophy*, 30.

<sup>44</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 42; *Experience and Nature*, Later Works 1: 271-272; Alexander, *John Dewey*, 198-199.

<sup>45</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 140, 144. See also, Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, Middle Works 9:246.

<sup>46</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 9, 58, 167. See also, Alexander, *John Dewey*, xix, 187-8, 195; David L. Hildebrand, *Dewey: A Beginner’s Guide* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2008). Reichling argues that Dewey is not negating the physical art product itself, but is positing a more inclusive and dynamic approach to art. See Mary Reichling, “Images of Imagination: A

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Philosophical Study of Imagination in Music with Application to Music Education” (DME diss., Indiana University, 1991), 20.

<sup>47</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 53

<sup>48</sup> Jackson, *John Dewey and the Lessons of Art*, 6.

<sup>49</sup> Dewey, *Outline of a Critical Theory of Ethics*, Early Works 3:316; Hildebrand, *Dewey*, 165. It is crucial to note that in their critique of Reimer’s aesthetic philosophy of music education, praxial philosophers of music education have often construed the notion of “aesthetic” as that of Kantian “disinterestedness” rather than include Dewey’s more holistic approach. On this point and how Dewey’s and Kant’s ideas may come together in a fruitful *yin-yang* relationship, see Leonard Tan, “Reimer through Confucian Lenses: Resonances with Classical Chinese Aesthetics,” *Philosophy of Music Education Review* 23, no. 2 (2015): 188-192.

<sup>50</sup> Joseph H. Kupfer, *Experience as Art: Aesthetics in Everyday Life* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983).

<sup>51</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 11; Zeltner, *John Dewey’s Aesthetic Philosophy*, 3; Stroud, *John Dewey and the Artful Life*, 6. For the pragmatists, aesthetics cannot be narrowly taken to refer to a philosophy of art since the aesthetic experience extends beyond what we know as art. See Richard Shusterman, “Aesthetics,” in *A Companion to Pragmatism*, eds. John R. Shook and Joseph Margolis (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing; 2006), 352.

<sup>52</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 16. On “everyday aesthetics,” see Katya Mandoki, *Everyday Aesthetics: Prosaics, the Play of Culture and Social Identities* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007); David Fenner, “Environmental Aesthetics and the Dynamic Object,” *Ethics and the Environment* 11, no. 1 (2006): 1-19; *Introducing Aesthetics*, 126. One critique of everyday aesthetics is that the nature of the aesthetic experience is construed too widely; it allows virtually



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everything, including powerboats, loaves of bread, and telephones, to count as art. See Noël Carroll, *Philosophy of Art* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 174. However, this betrays the a priori assumption that some objects are art objects and others are not. This assumption would be disagreeable to the pragmatists who posit a non-essentialist theory of art. There is no reason why powerboats cannot be considered works of art just because they serve instrumental purposes; they can be made with skill and elaborately decorated just like any other art object. See Stroud, *John Dewey and the Artful Life*, 91. See also, Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 13; Alexander, *John Dewey*, 190.

<sup>53</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 347.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 191.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 87.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 172.

<sup>57</sup> Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, Later Works 1: 274.

<sup>58</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 212. Dewey also argues that listening to the main theme in Beethoven's Fifth symphony enables one to come to "a clear conception of what force is and is not in the arts" (Ibid., 227).

<sup>59</sup> Dewey, "The Philosophy of the Arts," Later Works 13:358; "Pragmatic America," Middle Works 13: 307; *Psychology*, Early Works 2: 77.

<sup>60</sup> Drawing on the ideas of Abraham Maslow, Paul Tillich, Rudolf Otto, and Friedrich Schleiermacher, Iris Yob unpacked the notion of spirituality and proposed ways in which music educators can move towards spiritual education. See Iris M. Yob, "If We Knew What Spirituality Was, We Would Teach for It," *Music Educators Journal* 98, no. 2 (2011): 41-47.

<sup>61</sup> On this point, see Dewey's *Democracy and Education* (Middle Works 9).

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<sup>62</sup> Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, Middle Works 12: 135; *Democracy and Education*, Middle Works 9:24.

<sup>63</sup> Estelle R. Jorgensen, "Music Education in Broad Perspective," *The Quarterly* 2, no. 3 (1991): 15.

<sup>64</sup> Israel Scheffler, *Four Pragmatists: A Critical Introduction to Peirce, James, Mead, and Dewey* (New York, NY: Routledge and Kegan Paul Inc.), 250.

<sup>65</sup> On linking popular and classical music, see Rose Subotnik Rosengard, "The Challenge of Contemporary Music," in *What is Music?* ed. Philip Alperson (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987), 359-396. For more current scholarship on the extent and value of popular music in schools, see Martina Vasil, "Integrating Popular Music and Informal Music Learning Practices: A Multiple Case Study of Secondary School Music Teachers Enacting Change in Music Education," *International Journal of Music Education* 37, no. 2 (2019): 298-310; Alexis Anja Kallio, "Popular 'Problems': Deviantization and Teachers' Curation of Popular Music," *International Journal of Music Education* 35, no. 3 (2017): 319-332; Roger Mantie, "A Comparison of 'Popular Music Pedagogy' Discourses," *Journal of Research in Music Education* 61, no. 3 (2013): 334-352; Joseph Abramo, "Queering Informal Pedagogy: Sexuality and Popular Music in School," *Music Education Research* 13, no. 4 (2011): 465-477; Phil Jenkins, "Formal and Informal Music Educational Practices," *Philosophy of Music Education Review* 19, no. 2 (2011): 179-197.

<sup>66</sup> Shusterman, *Pragmatist Aesthetics*, 169.

<sup>67</sup> For Shusterman, Greek drama and Elizabethan theater were originally produced and consumed as popular art before they achieved the status they do today. See Shusterman, *Pragmatist Aesthetics*, 181, 169.

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid., xii, 170.

<sup>69</sup> For Dewey, since new ideas are reconstructed out of old ones, knowledge of the past is crucial to understanding the present (Dewey, *Experience and Education*, Later Works 13: 52; “Knowledge Involving the Past,” Middle Works 13: 40-49). In particular, art “celebrates with peculiar intensity the moments in which the past reinforces the present” (*Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 24; *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, Middle Works 12: 134). See also, Ruth Zinar, “Music and Progressive Education,” *Music Educators Journal* 70, no. 5 (1984): 33-34.

<sup>70</sup> Dewey, *Experience and Education*, Later Works 13: *Democracy and Education*, Middle Works 9:12; Reba N. Page, “Curriculum Matters,” in *John Dewey and Our Educational Prospect: A Critical Engagement with Dewey’s Democracy and Education*, ed. David T. Hansen (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 39-65.

<sup>71</sup> Dewey, *Experience and Education*, Later Works 13: ch. 1.

<sup>72</sup> Estelle R. Jorgensen, *In Search of Music Education* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 75.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 76.

<sup>75</sup> Brenda Brenner, “Reflecting on the Rationales for String Study in Schools,” *Philosophy of Music Education Review* 18, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 59.

<sup>76</sup> Christopher Small, *Musicking—the Meanings of Performing and Listening* (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1998).

<sup>77</sup> Scott Goble, *What’s So Important About Music Education?* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 56.

<sup>78</sup> Richard Kraus, *Pianos and Politics in China – Middle-Class Ambitions and the Struggle Over Western Music* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), ix-x.

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<sup>79</sup> Shusterman, *Pragmatist Aesthetics*, 141-147, 195. See also, Stroud, *John Dewey and the Artful Life*, 44.

<sup>80</sup> Richard Shusterman, "Of the Scandal of Taste: Social Privilege as Nature in the Aesthetic Theories of Hume and Kant," *Philosophical Forum* 20, no. 3 (1989), 211-229.

<sup>81</sup> Resisting high art is a stand taken by Roger Taylor in his *Art, an Enemy of the People* (Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press, 1978), 155.

<sup>82</sup> Foster McMurray, "Pragmatism in Music Education," in *Basic Concepts in Music Education: The Fifty-Seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, ed. Nelson B. Henry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 62, 69.

<sup>83</sup> Shusterman, *Pragmatist Aesthetics*, 142-143.

<sup>84</sup> By formalism, I refer to the notion that the value of a work of art is determined entirely by its form. On Dewey's critique of formalism, see Armen T. Marsoobian, "Art and the Aesthetic," in *The Blackwell Guide to American Philosophy*, eds. Armen T. Marsoobian and John Ryder (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 378-379. Given Dewey's critique of formalism, Zeltner notes it seems rather ironic that Leonard Meyer's formalist theory of music was derived from Dewey. See Zeltner, *John Dewey's Aesthetic Philosophy*, 102.

<sup>85</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 42, 120-121, 188.

<sup>86</sup> See Alexander, *John Dewey*, xx, 194, 206, 233, 234, 235, 239, 240; Hildebrand, *Dewey*, 168-170; Shusterman, "Aesthetics," 354.

<sup>87</sup> For an application of Dewey's aesthetic theory to the final movement from Brahms 4th Symphony, see William R. Hutchinson, "Aesthetic and Musical Theory: An Aspect of Their Juncture," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 24, no. 3 (1966): 393-400.

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<sup>88</sup> On form in gamelan music, see Bonnie Wade, *Thinking Musically—Experiencing Music, Expressing Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press), 83-86.

<sup>89</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 115. See also, Bart Vandenabeele, “‘New’ Media, Art, and Intercultural Communication,” *The Journal of Aesthetic Education* 38, no. 4 (2004): 1-9.

<sup>90</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 334.

<sup>91</sup> Shusterman, *Pragmatist Aesthetics*, 172; Richard Shusterman, “Popular Art and Education,” *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 13, no. 3 (1995): 206.

<sup>92</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 333.

<sup>93</sup> This paragraph draws from Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 335-339.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., See also, Charlene Morton, “Boom Diddy Boom Boom: Critical Multiculturalism and Music Education,” *Philosophy of Music Education Review* 9, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 32-41.

<sup>95</sup> Amongst others, Keith Swanwick takes the position that intercultural music education opens students’ minds. See Swanwick, *Music, Mind, and Education* (London: Routledge, 1988).

<sup>96</sup> In like vein, Jorgensen suggests that “great” and “little” musical traditions may enjoy a symbiotic relationship as they mutually influence each other; she further notes that Kodály advocates using both folk and classical music to teach young children. See Jorgensen, *In Search of Music Education*, 75. Similarly, Sidney Finkelstein in his *Composer and Nation: The Folk Heritage in Music*, 2nd ed. (New York: International Publishers, 1989), illustrates how classical and vernacular music may be related to each other.

<sup>97</sup> On tribal rhythms and Western harmony, see Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 171. See also, Elizabeth Oehrle, “An Introduction to African Views of Music Making,” *Journal of*

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*Aesthetic Education* 25, no. 3, Special Issue: Philosophy of Music and Music Education (1991): 163-174.

<sup>98</sup> Dewey, *The Child and the Curriculum*, Middle Works 2: 282. In later writings, Dewey substitutes “old education” for “traditional education” and “new education” for “progressive education.” See Alan Ryan, *John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 281.

<sup>99</sup> In Dewey’s words, “the child and the curriculum are simply two limits which define a single process.” The child and the curriculum are not bifurcated; rather, their relationship is a continuum with the child’s interest at one pole and the curriculum at the other. See Dewey, *The Child and the Curriculum*, Middle Works 2: 272-291. See also, *Experience and Nature*, Later Works 1: 141; *Experience and Education*, Later Works 13: 7.

<sup>100</sup> Dewey, *Experience and Education*, Later Works 13: ch. 7; *Democracy and Education*, Middle Works 9: 13.

<sup>101</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 93; Alexander, *John Dewey*, 229-330.

<sup>102</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 305-310. Take for example, the oft-cited criticism that too many educational band works are written in ABA form. Should one set a rule then, that the use of ABA form necessarily connotes bad music? Clearly, rule-based aesthetic adjudication is narrow and problematic. For Dewey, “the question for the critic is the adequacy of form to matter, and not that of the presence or absence of any particular form.” See Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 325.

<sup>103</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 311-318; Alexander, *John Dewey*, 201; Hildebrand, *Dewey*, 173-175.

<sup>104</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 313.

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 166, 143, 208; Jackson, *John Dewey and the Lessons of Art*, 45-56. Dewey describes “unity in variety” as “the one and the many” and the “old formula for beauty in nature and art” (Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 166).

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., 46-47, 208. Carroll opposes Dewey’s criteria, claiming that John Cage’s 4’33’’ does not consummate. Phillip Jackson, however, defends Dewey and counters that 4’33’’ does consummate. See Carroll, *Beyond Aesthetics*, 51; Jackson, *John Dewey and the Lessons of Art*, 78-87. Regardless, Dewey does not regard his aesthetic values as permanently fixed; instead, they should be continually tested (Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 100-101, 110, 325).

<sup>107</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 150.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., 314.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., 60-61, 304, 314-315, 327-328.

<sup>111</sup> Maxine Greene, *Releasing the Imagination: Essays on Education, the Arts, and Social Change* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1995), 30.

<sup>112</sup> On the need to be immersed in various artistic traditions, see Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 314-315.

<sup>113</sup> Jorgensen warns against pandering to student and public opinions that turns music education into a form of miseducative entertainment, warning that “if not monitored closely, the educational industry can contribute to mis-educative experiences and possibly become the tail that wags the dog.” See Jorgensen, “Music Education in Broad Perspective,” 15.

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<sup>114</sup> See Robert Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), ch. 4; David K. Cohen, “Dewey’s Problem,” *The Elementary School Journal* 98, no. 5, (1998): 427-446.

<sup>115</sup> Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Later Works 10: 172; *Experience and Nature*, Later Works 1: 274.