Options
The United States involvement in Singapore, 1953-1960
Author
Long, Joey Shi Ruey
Supervisor
Crosswell, Daniel
Abstract
Revisionist Eisenhower scholars have praised the Eisenhower administration's diplomatic record. The revisionists credited President Dwight D. Eisenhower for showing remarkable prudence and restraints during crises over Indochina, Quemoy and Matsu, Suez and Berlin. The president worked for peace and he kept the peace. In contrast to the views of contemporary pundits and analysts during the Eisenhower years, the revisionists also argued the president actively shaped, led and ran the policymaking process. Some scholars-labelled postrevisionists-qualified the revisionists' assertions. While the postrevisionists agreed Ike was very much in control of the decision-making process, they argued there were flaws in the Eisenhower government's conduct of foreign affairs-particularly in the manner the administration handled Third World affairs. The administration consistently misjudged Third World nationalism for communism. The US formulated and executed policies directed toward newly emerging nation-states on faulty Cold War premises. In the end, rather than orienting these newly emerging states to the West, the Eisenhower administration alienated them. This study, by relying on previously unused primary sources, details the Eisenhower administration's involvement in the newly emerging nation-state of Singapore.
During the 1950s, the British retreated from their Southeast Asian empire. The 1950s marked a period of transition for the island-state, from British colonial control to self-government. The 1950s was also a trying time. Social and political upheavals accompanied decolonisation as nationalists struggled against each other and the British to control the country's destiny. Concerned about threats to US strategic and economic interests in Singapore, the Eisenhower administration interfered in local affairs to ensure a pro-Western and anti-communist government emerged to govern the island-state. With the advent of the Cold War, US policymakers approached world affairs based on balance-of-power notions. No country could be lost to communism without a concomitant adverse effect on US physical security, economic health and way of life.
The US involvement, however, added an intrusive and divisive foreign dynamic into Singapore's internal affairs. Washington erroneously regarded radical, yet genuine, nationalists as communists. The Eisenhower administration instead supported political factions that appeared moderate, pro-Western and anti-communist but who were unable to govern effectively or garner popular support. US prejudices and interference estranged nationalist groups and the fiercely anti-colonial electorate who loathed to see another foreign power occupy the political position vacated by the British. When Singapore eventually attained self-government in 1959, the Eisenhower administration further embittered local nationalists when the CIA was implicated in a plot, in 1960, to subvert a local intelligence officer. US relations with the Singaporean government worsened.
This study sustains the postrevisionist criticisms of Eisenhower's Third World policy. The Eisenhower administration failed to realise its Cold War-distorted policies tended to antagonise nationalists in Singapore. The US confused nationalism and communism. The US also failed to accomplish its goal of fostering allies in Singapore. As a result of the Eisenhower government's misguided involvement in that island-state, an enduring legacy of suspicion has lingered in US-Singapore relations.
During the 1950s, the British retreated from their Southeast Asian empire. The 1950s marked a period of transition for the island-state, from British colonial control to self-government. The 1950s was also a trying time. Social and political upheavals accompanied decolonisation as nationalists struggled against each other and the British to control the country's destiny. Concerned about threats to US strategic and economic interests in Singapore, the Eisenhower administration interfered in local affairs to ensure a pro-Western and anti-communist government emerged to govern the island-state. With the advent of the Cold War, US policymakers approached world affairs based on balance-of-power notions. No country could be lost to communism without a concomitant adverse effect on US physical security, economic health and way of life.
The US involvement, however, added an intrusive and divisive foreign dynamic into Singapore's internal affairs. Washington erroneously regarded radical, yet genuine, nationalists as communists. The Eisenhower administration instead supported political factions that appeared moderate, pro-Western and anti-communist but who were unable to govern effectively or garner popular support. US prejudices and interference estranged nationalist groups and the fiercely anti-colonial electorate who loathed to see another foreign power occupy the political position vacated by the British. When Singapore eventually attained self-government in 1959, the Eisenhower administration further embittered local nationalists when the CIA was implicated in a plot, in 1960, to subvert a local intelligence officer. US relations with the Singaporean government worsened.
This study sustains the postrevisionist criticisms of Eisenhower's Third World policy. The Eisenhower administration failed to realise its Cold War-distorted policies tended to antagonise nationalists in Singapore. The US confused nationalism and communism. The US also failed to accomplish its goal of fostering allies in Singapore. As a result of the Eisenhower government's misguided involvement in that island-state, an enduring legacy of suspicion has lingered in US-Singapore relations.
Date Issued
1998
Call Number
DS610.47.U6 Lon
Date Submitted
1998