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Why was a "total war" model not applied by the British in the defence of Malaya?
Author
Sung, Kelvin Sheng Yi
Supervisor
Hack, Karl
Abstract
This study is not another campaign history and does not join the debates on why Malaya and Singapore fell to the Japanese. Instead, it asks why Britain failed to wage "total war" to deal with Japan in Malaya. "Total war" involves the mobilization of a country's human, financial and material resources to wage war. The viability of a "total war" model is dependent upon the cooperation between the civil and military establishments, mobilization of sufficient human and material resources, and the infusion of a national spirit to galvanize the various races towards the defense of a country.
Britain's failure to wage "total war" in Malaya has still not been satisfactorily resolved by the existing historiography on the fall of Malaya and Singapore. A number of plausible explanations have been put forward as to why Britain failed to implement a "total war" model in Malaya. These reasons include the lack of resources, lacklustre leadership, civil-military tensions, and strategic and economic constraints. This academic exercise will ultimately hope to argue that of all the reasons: British racial-imperial ideology was the most important impediment to "total war" in the Far East.
This study will argue that racial-imperial ideology helped to confirm and entrench a disunited and disparate society that proved unable to defend itself. Ironically, the British saddled themselves with the responsibility of maintaining the 'white man's burden.' The failure to implement "total war" in Malaya drives home the importance of involving citizens, regardless of race or religion, to take measures to defend their own country. In order to achieve these objectives, this study will utilize a number of primary sources - official British documents, and the published memoirs of participants in the Malayan Campaign (1941-1942). Other primary sources consulted include the newspapers of the time, namely the Straits Times and the Straits Budget.
Britain's failure to wage "total war" in Malaya has still not been satisfactorily resolved by the existing historiography on the fall of Malaya and Singapore. A number of plausible explanations have been put forward as to why Britain failed to implement a "total war" model in Malaya. These reasons include the lack of resources, lacklustre leadership, civil-military tensions, and strategic and economic constraints. This academic exercise will ultimately hope to argue that of all the reasons: British racial-imperial ideology was the most important impediment to "total war" in the Far East.
This study will argue that racial-imperial ideology helped to confirm and entrench a disunited and disparate society that proved unable to defend itself. Ironically, the British saddled themselves with the responsibility of maintaining the 'white man's burden.' The failure to implement "total war" in Malaya drives home the importance of involving citizens, regardless of race or religion, to take measures to defend their own country. In order to achieve these objectives, this study will utilize a number of primary sources - official British documents, and the published memoirs of participants in the Malayan Campaign (1941-1942). Other primary sources consulted include the newspapers of the time, namely the Straits Times and the Straits Budget.
Date Issued
1999
Call Number
DS596.6 Sun
Date Submitted
1999