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"War by tantrum" : Richard Nixon and the resolution of the Vietnam War
Author
Pang, Yang Huei
Supervisor
Crosswell, Daniel
Abstract
In numerous post-facto books churned out by Nixon's camp, the final Paris agreement in 1973 was argued to have been a result of the aerial bombardment : Linebacker II. Nixon was credited with various astute initiatives such as Triangulation, Negotiations and Vietnamization.
Actually, Nixon was acutely aware of the limited results. Fueled by a deep seated fear Linebacker II might be exposed for the fraud it really was, Nixon embarked upon a spectacular bowdlerizing effort roundly proclaiming the decisiveness of Linebacker II. Even in his numerous post-presidency books such as The Real War and No More Vietnams, Nixon blithely vindicated the December decision.
This study repudiates Nixon's chimerical claim Linebacker II achieved "Peace with Honor". From a narrow perspective, the failures of Vietnamization, Negotiations and Triangulation served to highlight the impossibility of achieving peace let alone honor. That Nixon had to crow on the "success" of Linebacker II only served to show the bankruptcy of his three initiatives.
This account proposes a larger conceptualization viewing Linebacker II not as an aberration of Nixon's war, but fundamentally a coalescence of Nixon's obsessions. While various accounts provided important insights, sorely lacking in an analysis of Nixon's persona in relation to the resolution of the Vietnam war.
It is worth considering the nature of Nixon's trenchant vindictiveness. These dark impulses could be found in Nixon's presidency. Personal tendencies such as ruthlessness and political expediency formed an indispensable aperu which Nixon relied upon. Aggravated by the failures of Vietnamization, Negotiations and Triangulation, Nixon's punitive mood repeatedly surfaced. Rationalizing his rancor as "Madman Theory" or brinkmanship, Nixon appeared to be practicing statesmanship. In reality, Nixon had personalized the Vietnam problem. He ruthlessly resolved to conclude the conflict on his own terms. These themes formed the leitmotif of Nixon's war.
With the conflict personalized, the necessity for Hanoi to be bombed in December was apparent. With South Vietnam stubbornly refusing to budge and with threats of humiliation at the hands of either Saigon or Hanoi looming, Linebacker II became for Nixon a "war by tantrum".
Furthermore, air power via USAF's doctrine appeared ideally suited to serve Nixon's "Madman Theory." No other military arm of the United States offered a clear cut solution. For the USAF, supporting Nixon reinforced their raison d'etat. From the USAF's inception, it battled skepticism over its doctrine. Vietnam had shaken the USAF's very credibility. Its civilian superiors pondered its effectiveness. Against this tapestry, the need for the USAF vigorously backing the myth of Linebacker II became glaringly apparent.
Linebacker II failed the ultimate test in credibility. Plagued with squabbles in the chain of command and intimidated by early B-52s losses on the third day, Linebacker II very nearly brought into question the validity of the SAC's existence. The following quote was telling about the real "effectiveness" of Linebacker II. "Now we have to start to play," Nixon instructed Kissinger on the 25 January 1973, "to those who are willing to give us somewhat of a break in writing the history of these times."
Actually, Nixon was acutely aware of the limited results. Fueled by a deep seated fear Linebacker II might be exposed for the fraud it really was, Nixon embarked upon a spectacular bowdlerizing effort roundly proclaiming the decisiveness of Linebacker II. Even in his numerous post-presidency books such as The Real War and No More Vietnams, Nixon blithely vindicated the December decision.
This study repudiates Nixon's chimerical claim Linebacker II achieved "Peace with Honor". From a narrow perspective, the failures of Vietnamization, Negotiations and Triangulation served to highlight the impossibility of achieving peace let alone honor. That Nixon had to crow on the "success" of Linebacker II only served to show the bankruptcy of his three initiatives.
This account proposes a larger conceptualization viewing Linebacker II not as an aberration of Nixon's war, but fundamentally a coalescence of Nixon's obsessions. While various accounts provided important insights, sorely lacking in an analysis of Nixon's persona in relation to the resolution of the Vietnam war.
It is worth considering the nature of Nixon's trenchant vindictiveness. These dark impulses could be found in Nixon's presidency. Personal tendencies such as ruthlessness and political expediency formed an indispensable aperu which Nixon relied upon. Aggravated by the failures of Vietnamization, Negotiations and Triangulation, Nixon's punitive mood repeatedly surfaced. Rationalizing his rancor as "Madman Theory" or brinkmanship, Nixon appeared to be practicing statesmanship. In reality, Nixon had personalized the Vietnam problem. He ruthlessly resolved to conclude the conflict on his own terms. These themes formed the leitmotif of Nixon's war.
With the conflict personalized, the necessity for Hanoi to be bombed in December was apparent. With South Vietnam stubbornly refusing to budge and with threats of humiliation at the hands of either Saigon or Hanoi looming, Linebacker II became for Nixon a "war by tantrum".
Furthermore, air power via USAF's doctrine appeared ideally suited to serve Nixon's "Madman Theory." No other military arm of the United States offered a clear cut solution. For the USAF, supporting Nixon reinforced their raison d'etat. From the USAF's inception, it battled skepticism over its doctrine. Vietnam had shaken the USAF's very credibility. Its civilian superiors pondered its effectiveness. Against this tapestry, the need for the USAF vigorously backing the myth of Linebacker II became glaringly apparent.
Linebacker II failed the ultimate test in credibility. Plagued with squabbles in the chain of command and intimidated by early B-52s losses on the third day, Linebacker II very nearly brought into question the validity of the SAC's existence. The following quote was telling about the real "effectiveness" of Linebacker II. "Now we have to start to play," Nixon instructed Kissinger on the 25 January 1973, "to those who are willing to give us somewhat of a break in writing the history of these times."
Date Issued
2002
Call Number
E855 Pan
Date Submitted
2002